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New Indonesian offensive 
in East Timor 
A major new Indonesian offensive has been under way in 
East Timor since August, though news of the operation has 
only recently been received. Two letters dated 19 and 26 
September reached Lisbon in October. One report says: 
"The enemy have increased their military presence in 
East Timor to tifty battalions, or about 40,000 men. 
Twelve battalions have been dispatched to Viqueque and 
Lospalos, in the eastern sector, to search tor Fretilin 
commander-in-chiet, Gusmao XanC11CJ. They have the support 
of four tighter planes and two mini-jets." 
The new offensive, code-named Operasi K ikis (Operation 
Extinction), is concentrated in the central and eastern 
sectors. News of the offensive coincides with reports of 
many arrests and disappearances (see page 15). 
At a press conterence in Lisbon, a Fretilin spokesman 
said the Indonesians are trying to wipe out Fretilin. 
"They think that, by capturing the leader, they will put 
an end to us. They cannot, as long as there is one 
Timorese alive." LThe Independent, 6 Novemberj 
Fence-of-leg operations 
In several regions in the east around Lospalos, as well 
as in Same in the central sector, civilians have been 
forced to join in operations to hunt down the guerrillas. 
Also in other eastern towns, Baguio, Que I icai, Baucau and 
Veni la le, people have been ordered to join fence-of-leg 
operations to flush out guerrillas controlling territory 
in the south. The objective ot this operation is to gain 
control ot Fretilin bases. A major aim of the Indonesian 
strategists is to encircle guerrillas based around Mount 
Matebian and further south towards the coast. 
With the food production so precarious (see page 18), 
this will exacerbate the tood shortages as many able-
bodied men are forced to leave their homes. 
In the centre I sector, the otfensi ve appears to have 
the character of a classical military operation. Six 
battalions have been thrown in around Soibada, Barique, 
Bubur Loran and Weberec, and four armoured troop vehicles 
are known to be operating in the area. One battalion with 
six armoured vehicles is being deployed in Maubisse, four 
battalions in the bay of Tibor, west of Dili, four 
battalions in Aipelo, four in Bernos, two in Areia Branca, 
two in Hera, two in Metinaro, and two in Beban. 
The focus on the eastern sector supports the widely-
held belief that this sector continues to be a Fretilin 
stronghold. At the same time, the major concentration of 
troops in the central sector confirms recent reports that 
the guerrillas have, since 1984, been stepping up their 
activities in this part of the country. The Indonesian 
mmy now seems bent on reversing that trend. 
SoMe of the newly-deployed troops were landed by 
warship on secluded beaches along the north coast, in the 
bay of Tibor, west of Dili, fanning out into the rugged 
mountain interior south of the capitol. Others deployed 
inland may have been dropped by parachute. 
The 26 September letter reports that on 15 September 
three more battalions arrived in Dili in armoured 
vehicles. The writer points to a marked increase in the 
number of military vehicles bearing civilian number-
plates. 
The lndepe11de11t [6 November] quotes western diplomats 
as confirming that the Indonesian army hos been stepping 
up activities in East Timor for several months. 
British military equipment and the offensive 
The offensive is making use of small jets, warships, 
armoured cars and parachutes, the very type of military 
equipment thot has been supplied to Indonesia in the last 
few years by the UK. 1he small jets are more than likely 
to be Hawks, mc:nufoctured by British Aerospace. This must 
reinforce the demand that the British Government should 
immediately impose an embargo on all arms sales to 
Indonesia. 
Hawk ground-attack aircraft 
We are not yet able to assess the effects of the latest 
operations on the population and the guerrilla forces. 
Writing from Dili, one source says that Dili hospital is 
ful 1 of Indonesian casualties. During one operation in 
Same, in the central zone, four Indonesian soldiers and 
two Timorese hansips (civil guards) were killed. 
Chico Toi Na, a commander in Falintil, Fretilin's armed 
wing, was killed in battle in the Matebian region. 
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EXECUTIONS 
Nine long-terni political prisoners executed 
Nine long-term political prisoners, all of them sentenced to death for alleged involvement in the events of ~~tober 196~, 
which President Suharto claims were instigated by the Indonesian Ccm m unist Party (PK I), were executed by fi.rrng squad in 
late September or early October. With the exception of two who were sentenced in 1972 and 1973, they had all been under 
sentence of death for 18, 19 or 20 years. 
The victims of this latest round of judicial killings 
were: 
Abdullah Alihamy, 64 years, arrested in March 1967 and 
sentenced to death by a Special Military Tribunal in Riau 
in 1968. Alihomy was secretary of the Riau PKI provincial 
committee and became a full member of the PK I Central 
Committee in 1964. For a time, reports were circulating 
that his death sentence had been commuted to life. 
Throughout his imprisonment, he was held in Padang, 
West Sumatra while his family lives in Pakanboru. 
Amor Hanofioh, 62 years, arrested in late 1965 and 
sentenced to death by a Special Military Tribunal in 
Banjarmasin some time in 1967. He was secretary of the 
South Kalimantan PK I provincial committee. As with 
Alihamy, it was thought al· one time that his sentence had 
been commuted to life. Although Hanafiah became an 
Amnesty 'investigation' case, nothing more was ever 
discovered about his case or the circumstances of his 
imprisonment, until his name appeared on the list of 
prisoners executed this year. 
Syom Kamaruzzomm, 60 years, was detained in March 1967 
and sentenced to death by Special Military Tribunal in 
Morch 1968. He was held for much of the time in Cipinong 
Prison, Jakarta or at the Jakarta Military Prison. He is 
reported to have been transferred from Cipinang Prison at 
his own request because other political prisoners refused 
to associate with him. 
He was known as a trade unionist in the 1940s. He later 
become a confidant of D.N. Aidit, chairman of the PK I, 
and eventually became chairman of Aidit's Special Bureau. 
During the years before 1965, he was playing a double 
role, within PK I intelligence and in army intelligence. 
[See separate item.] 
Lieutenant Kamil, 58 years, arrested in October 1965 in 
Jogjakarta, Central Java. By the time of the 1965 events, 
he was platoon security commander and deputy intelligence 
officer in Battalion L. He was found guilty of taking 
part in the murder of two army officers in Jogjakarta at 
the beginning of October 1965. At his trial, he said he 
had been acting on his commander's orders and that he and 
his family were under threat. He was not from any 
political party. 
He was sentenced to death by a m iii tory court in 
Jogjakarta in Moy 1967. He spent most of his imprisonment 
in Semarang or on the prison island of Nusakembangan, 
Central Java. 
SUxirlo alias Waluyo alias Mulyono, 58 years, was arrested 
in August 1067 and sentenced to death by Special Military 
Court in October 1968. In his trial, he was described as 
the 'third man' in Aidit's Special Bureau. He spent 
virtually all his imprisonment in Cipinong Prison, 
Jakarta. 
Air Force Colonel Sudiono, 63 years, arrested in mid 
1966. He was sentenced to death by Special Military Court 
in Morch 1973. In early 1982, when his request for 
presidential clemency was turned down, his wife was told 
On 6 October, about two thousand people demonstrated 
outside the Indonesian Embassy in Paris to protest 
against the executions. Photo: Joel Lumien, l'Humanite. 
his execution was imminent. In fact, it was another four 
and a hol f years before he come before the firing squad. 
Supono Marsudiyono, 65 years, was arrested in F ebruory 
1969 and sentenced to death by a Special Military Court 
in March 1972. He was said by Syom to be the second man 
in Aidit's Special Bureau, but virtually nothing more is 
known about him except for testimony given about him by 
Syam. He spent virtually his entire imprisonment in 
Cipinong Prison, Jakarta. 
TornJ£i Hidoyat, 61 years, was sentenced to death probably 
by a Special Military Court in Bali in September 1967. 
The date of his arrest is not known. He was in the army 
but was demobilised in 1964, apparently because of ill-
heolth. In 1965, he was working as a security officer at 
a Bali hotel. At one time, it was thought that his 
sentence had been commuted to life imprisonment. 
Suyono Wiryootmojo. 66 years, was sentenced to death by 
Special Military Court in Medon, North Sumatra in October 
1966. The date of his arrest is not known. In the late 
1950s, he was a member of the PK I Central Java provincial 
committee, but later apparently became involved in 
security and intelligence work. 
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Misinformation about "appeals procedures" 
Although there was no official confirmation of these 
executions until 8 October, reports that executions had 
taken place were received from Indonesia soon after the 
first of the victims were taken from Cipinang Prison in 
Jakarta and executed by firing squad in Cimanggis on 26 
September. The Dutch, Australian and British governments 
made several enquiries about the reported executions. 
West European governments showed their concern especially 
because the executions came just weeks before a joint 
Eurq:leCl'l CanmlKlity/ASEAN meeting of foreign ministers was 
due to take place in Jakarta on 20 and 21 October. 
As the foreign ministers gathered for the meeting, 
several made formal complaints to the Indonesian 
government, stressing that the executed men had been in 
pris~n for so many years. Sir Geoffrey Howe, British 
Foreign Secretary and currently chairman of the European 
Community, expressed concern, while France's European 
Affairs Minister, Bernard Bosson, said that, from a 
humanitarian point of view, the French government and 
people "were shocked and overwhelmed", considering it 
"inhumane to execute nine people in jail for fifteen 
years [ AFP, 21 October 1986] 
The Indonesian authorities rebuffed these complaints by 
claiming that the executed men had been dealt with 
"according to the law". Foreign Minister, Mochtar 
K usumaatmaja, himself a lawyer by profession, asserted 
that the time lag was the result of "lengthy appeals 
procedures". This is grossly misleading since most if not 
all nine men had no right to any appeal against their 
s<;mtence. Ou.r records show that eight and possibly all 
nine were tried before special military tribunals which 
are courts of first and last resort. This means that 
their only recourse was to plead for presidential 
clemency. 
Haji Princen, a well-known Indonesian human rights 
activist working in Jakarta, rejected government claims 
about "lengthy procedures". He described the execution as 
inhuman and barboric, and said: "You don't leave 20 years 
to ask the President for a pardon. It is immensely cruel 
to keep people in prison and in uncertainty about their 
fate that long." L Guardian, 10 October 1986] 
Cruel deception 
The Army went out of its way to deceive the death 
sentence prisoners just days before the first executions 
took place. Reports have reached T APOL of a visit on 19 
September to Cipinang Prison by Brigadier-General Pieter 
Damanik, official spokesman of the Department of Defence. 
All the death sentence prisoners were gathered to hear 
Brig-General Damanik say: 
"I have come to see for myself how you all are. Apart 
from that, I want to ask you for information about the 
.addresses of your families, and to know what plans you 
have and what work you intend to do after you make your 
return to society. It seems many of you are not able to 
say for sure what address you will go to, once you return 
to society, so we want to help you find temporary 
accommodation. We may also be able to help you re-enter 
whatever profession you wish to thoose." Brig-General 
Damanik also implied that the men could expect to be 
released after the general elections to be held in April 
next year. 
Some of the prisoners appear to have been taken in by 
Damanik's assurances. Air Force Sudiono responded by 
saying that he was hoping to find work as a translator. 
The effect of the Defence Department spokesman's visit 
was to create an atmosphere of calm, and may have 
resulted in not much attention initially being paid when 
three of the four Cipinang prisoners who were executed, 
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were taken from their cells on 23 September, _three days 
before their execution. A week later, on 30 September, 
Col. Sudiono was taken from his cell. He was executed on 
3 October. 
It was the same Brig-Gen. Damanik who later, on 9 
October, confirmed that nine men had been executed. 
European Parliament condemns executions 
On 10 October, the European Parliament adopted a 
resolution by 84 votes to 38 asserting that it is "a 
flagrant violation of human rights to execute a person 
almost 20 years after death sentence was passed". It 
called on EEC Foreign Ministers to condemn the executions 
and to call upon the Indonesian Government to treat the 
other prisoners in accordance with international 
conventions relating to basic human rights. It also 
coiled for a comprehensive report from the Commission on 
relations between the Community and Indonesia and asked 
the Commission "to review those relations in the light of 
the report and the recent executions". 
Many more 
risk of 
prisoners 
execution 
at 
According to T APOL 's records, there are twenty-six 
political prisoners still under death sentence on charges 
of involvement in the events of October 1965. Four teen 
ore members of the armed forces, in most cases, the army. 
Nine were in the Cakrabirawa Palace Guard and were tried 
for having been members of kidnap squads sent to capture 
six army generals, the incident that sparked the events 
of October 1965. E !even were PK I activists or leading 
members of the All-Indonesia Trade Union Federation 
(S~BSI) or the youth organisation, Pemuda Rakyat, both of 
which were outlawed by Suharto, together with the PK I. 
The identity of the twenty-sixth man on the list is not 
known. 
Announcement 
TAPOL 's full name is now changed to: 
TAPOL 
the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign 
of 
We take this opportunity 
wishing al I our readers and supporters 
A Happy New Year for 1987! 
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RED DRIVE 
Personal 'cleanliness' and Pancasila 
In the old days, there were 'nan-involvement' certificates. Today, there are 'self-cleansing' certificates. This is how 
the regime keeps alive the communist bogey. 
During the first ten years or so of military rule in 
Indonesia, when around a hundred thousand political 
prisoners were still behind bars without trial as suspect 
communists or communist sympathisers, the 'certif icote of 
non-involvement' was used to screen people at every 
stage. The certificate, issued by local military 
officers, was required as proof that a person hod not 
been a merrber of any of the banned organisations alleged 
by the security forces to have been involved in the 
October 1965 events. The suspect organisations were the 
Indonesian Communist Porty (PK I} and mmy dozens of moss 
organisations and trade unions allegedly under PK I 
domination. 
Non-involvement certificates had to be produced when 
applying for a job in the state sector, in 'vital 
industries', and in the private sector as well, lest 
companies be accused of harbouring communists. They had 
to be produced when entering academic institutes and when 
taking many other steps in the advancement of one's 
career. 
By the end of the 1970s, however, non-involvement 
certificates had lost their logic, if only because so 
many people applying for jobs would have been too young 
in 1965 to be involved in anything. But the system of 
blanket security checks and screening did not go out of 
fashion with the demise of the non-involvement 
certificate. 
Purging a hundred 
By our special correspondent in J al<arta. 
With so many young faces now appearing on the lists of 
candidates for the election, the regime is finding it 
difficult to test their loyalty to the New Order, so 
they've come up with the idea of insisting on every 
nomination being accompanied by a document confirming 
that the candidate has no relatives or in-lows, alive or 
dead, going bock two generations, who were members of the 
PK I or its mass organisations (ormas). 
Nominations are submitted along with a certificate of 
cleanliness from the local administration, which is then 
sent to Kopkamtib for further evaluation. This is how 
candidates are selected, not by the people in the ballot 
box. 
In 1965, the PK I had a membership of 3 m ii )ion. If we 
add to that the membership of the peasants union, trade 
unions, the youth and women's organisations and so on, 
that were banned along with the PKI, JO million would be 
a conservative estimate of the total membership. Each of 
these people would have had, say, ten relatives, in-laws 
and close friends. How many untainted people would be 
left who do not, somewhere going back two generations or 
among relatives of their own generation, hove someone 
with PK I or ormos connections? 
Anyc:ne accused of being a commuiist or ormas member CCI'\ 
swear a thousand times over that this is not true, but 
there's no chance of anyone in power ever believing him 
or her. 
!2P.il 27 . t.11 
"Beware of the PK I!' woms General Amir Mochnu4 chairmm 
of those great bastions of Indonesia's Pancasila 
Democracy, its Parliament Gnd Consultative Assembly. 
rn i II ion people 
Is this a general election or a campaign to renew the 
purges, this time seeking out subversives in the most 
unlikely ot places? 
The B envelope 
In the Armed Forces, they aren't using these Personal 
Cleanliness certificates. They've concocted another 
scheme, the B envelope. The intelligence section of each 
uni~ has been sending a 'B envelope' to the local 
military command (koramil) at the birth-place ot each 
soldier in its unit. The koramil must investigate the 
tamily background of each and every soldier and return 
the results to the unit in the B envelope. The contents 
ore then fed onto a computer. Any soldier with a PK I 
suspect among his or her relatives is automatically 
declared non -active. 
Only recently, b soldiers in the elite para-commando 
regiment stationed at Cijontung, Jakarta, were made non-
active because of what their B envelopes contained. 
So, communist ideology in Indonesia did not die with 
the seizure of the PK I Central Committee's headquarters. 
Twenty-one years on, the Indonesian army, the strongest 
and biggest in South-east Asia, is not yet convinced that 
it has purged Indonesian soil ot communism.• 
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'Personal cleanliness = political purity 
Today, a new certificate hos been devised, the Surat 
Keterangan Bersih Diri (SKBD) or Certificate of Personal 
Cleanliness. This new security check hos evolved from the 
requirement already imposed on people for several years 
to prove that they have a 'clean environment' ('bersih 
l lngkungan'). Screening now extends far beyond a person's 
own involvement in organisations that have already been 
banned for more than 20 years. It is now necessary to 
prove that you have no blood relatives or in-laws who 
were 'involved'. 
Already for several years, reports have appeared in the 
press of people being rejected for jobs or being 
dismissed because an aunt, mother-in-law or other close 
or more distant relative was suspected of 'involvement'. 
Often, proof of such involvement rests in the fact that 
the suspect relative was killed during the massacres 
which inflicted such heavy losses on communities in many 
parts of the country. 
Ironically, the SK B D requirement is now causing 
problems for quite a few candidates on the lists 
nominated by the three parties, Golkar, PPP and PDI for 
the forthcoming general elections. The lists are closely 
scrutinised by the security forces and many names have 
been excluded because of the alleged unreliability of 
their SK BD. Lack of a 'clean environment' is also being 
used to unseat and discredit rivals in the internal 
bickering that besets all three parties. 
All members of the national and provincial assemblies 
were recently subjected to lightning tests by Kopkamtib, 
to see whether their spouses, parents, grandparents, in-
laws or siblings were 'involved in the PKI'. If so, they 
cannot obtain an SKBD and may not be nominated in next 
year's elections [Tempo, 11 October 1986). 
'Intelligence' tests for workers 
Meanwhile, Kopkamtib last year produced a questionnaire 
which all employees in state and privately-run vital 
Human rights 
on computerised 
lawyer 
blacklist 
Mulya Lubis, the national director of the network of 
legal aid institutes, YLBHI, is on the black-list of 
people not permitted to go abroad. This become public 
when Ismael Saleh, Minister of Justice, was checking the 
Mulya Lubis 
new computer recently installed at the Sukarno-Hatto 
international airport in Jakart9. 
Al most by way ot a joke and in the company of a merry 
band ot journalists, Saleh asked the computer operator to 
give a display of how the computer works, telling him to 
feed in the name, Mulya Lubis. The lawyer's name soon 
flashed onto the screen with the explanation that he was 
not allowed to go abroad "for political reasons" l Pelita, 
31 October 1986). 
RED DRIVE 
industries throughout Indonesia are required to answer,. 
The questionnaire involves giving written answers as well 
as being interviewed by a merrber of the managem~nt or a 
local security (Kopkamtib) officer. The following are 
some of the questions employees are required to answer· 
[The complete questionnaire is published in Inside 
Indonesia, No 8, October 1986, p. 8.]: 
• Describe your family background and that of your 
spouse, starting with your grandparents and those of your 
spouse. Mention the religion(s) and organisations or 
parties they followed .... Give the names of your closest 
acquaintances during the last three years. 
• Explain the basis of your convictions or religion. Do 
you practice them diligently? 
• Soy which national or world heroes you admire and w~y. 
• Recite, Poncasila and explain your attitude towards it. 
• What is your view of the October 1965/PKI events? Were 
any members of your family involved? Do you agree that 
communism is a latent danger? 
" What is your attitude towards protest demonstrations 
with banners? 
• Explain your attitude towards the dual function of the 
Armed Forces. (This is the regime's principle of the 
Armed Forces having both a military and civilian role, 
the basis of Indonesian militarism.] 
• What is your attitude towards the New Order [set up by 
Suharto in 1965]? 
• What is your attitude towards citizens who do not vote 
in general elections? 
The questionnaire ends ominously with the words: 
''These questions are for you alone. If as a consequence 
of this, you ·are dismissed from your company, what would 
your attitude be? 
Be prepared to accept the risks if you make any 
erroneous statements." 
According to Inside Indonesia, the questionnaire was 
first used lost year in companies in the oil sector, and 
led to moss sackings in the industry at the end of 1985. 
Limited copies still available 
THE 
WdR 
dGdlftST 
EdSTTlmOR 
Price : £4.50 plus postage 
Plus postage: £0.75 UK. Europe . 
£3.00 airmail 
The Wfll Ag11inat Eaat Tlmor analyses Indonesia 's military and POiiticai 
strategy to sub1ugate and integrate East Timor since General Suharto's 
invasion of this former Portuguese colony in 1975. The authors, Carmel 
Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, present for the first time a comprehensive 
account of the current resurgence of Fretllin, which•• the national libera-
tion movement of the people of East Timor, following its earlier defeat in 
1977-78. 
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THE 1965 AFFAIR 
Suharto and the 1965 affair 
The execution of nine men found guilty in connection 
with the October 1965 affair has aroused new interest in 
the events which brought General Suharto to power. Among 
those facing the firing squad was Syam Kamaruzzaman, 
chairman of the so-called Special Bureau, a highly 
secretive body created by D.N. Aidit, chairman of the 
Indonesian Communist Party {PK I). This was the body in 
charge of Aidit's clandestine links with officers in the 
Armed Forces, the body alleged by Suharto to have been 
responsible for the kidnap and murder of six army 
generals on 1 October 1965, the event that unleashed a 
backlash resulting in the massacre of hundreds of 
thousands of leftwingers throughout the country. The PK I 
was smashed and President Sukarno was quickly isolated, 
paving the way for Suharto to take power and establish a 
system of repression that, over the years, has undermined 
and destroyed all the remaining political parties. 
It was Syam's eviaence about the role of the Special 
Bureau that was used by the regime to justify its 
annihilation of the PK I. Indeed, Syom was the only source 
of information about his dealings with Aidit, for the PK I 
chairman hod been murdered by troops in November 1965, 
acting on the orders of Suharto, then sti 11 commander of 
the army's strategic reserve, KOSTRAD. The story of 
Aidit's murder hos been told by the officer in charge, 
Colonel Yosir Hadibroto, now governor of the province of 
Lampung. [See T APOL Bulletin, No 72, November 1985.] 
Syom's execution come as o surprise 
It was widely believed by people trying to unravel the 
truth about October 1965, as wel I as by those in touch 
with tried prisoners still in prison, that Syom's death 
sentence would not be carried out. Since his own trial, 
he hod served the regime well by testifying in numerous 
trials and incriminating many people. Such betrayals had 
so angered other prisoners that he asked for transfer 
from Cipinang Prison, because of the hostility he 
experienced. 
Syam's role in the 1965 events was discussed in a CIA 
report on the affair, Indonesio-1965: The Coup that 
Backfired, which described Syam as "the most cooperative 
of witnesses. Once the Army got Syom to talk, it seems 
that he was almost anxious to tell everything he knew 
about the coup - - almost out of a sense of pride" [pages 
76 and 76a, footnote]. The CIA also revealed that Syam 
worked for ten years as a professional informer for 
Indonesian military intelligence, reporting on the doings 
of the PK I and other parties [p. 107]. In the CIA 's 
opinion, these facts show the extent of the PK l's 
penetration of the mi Ii tary apparatus but, as Ben 
Anderson and Ruth McVey have commented, "it is surely not 
Ille only way they con be reocl' [New Ycrk Review of Boolat 
1 June 1978]. 
By all accounts, Syam's Special Bureau was the link 
between Aidit and the army officers who staged the 
kidnappings that occurred around 3 om on 1 October 1965. 
According to Syam, the plans implemented by a group of 
three middle-ranking officers originated in the Bureau, 
working on Aidit's instructions. But the regime in 
Jakarta hos understandably never allowed any discussion 
of the links which Suharto himself, the man who emerged 
the victor, hod with the affair. 
In all, six gererols were kidnapped and murdered. Seven 
were torgetted, but General Nasution, then Armed Forces 
chief-of-staff, eteaped, though his infant daughter was 
fatally wounded in the assault on his hquse. All were 
generals on the army's general staff, the most important 
being General Yani, Army chief-of-staff, known as an 
anti-communist but also an admirer and loyal follower of 
President Sukarno. The officers who plotted the 
kidnappings, Lieutenant-Colonel Untung (already 
executed), Lieutenant-Colonel Latief (serving a life 
sentence), and Brigadier-General Supardjo (already 
executed) insisted at their trials that they hod not 
meant the victims to be murdered, but to be brought 
before President Sukarno to answer for plans they were 
allegedly making to launch a coup against him. 
The kidnappings were followed within hours by the 
occupation of several buildings, including the central 
radio station and the main telecommunications centre, 
~.: . 
Syam Komaruzzamm, on trial. [Tempo, 11 October 1986) 
both located on Merdeka Square in the centre of J okorto. 
The troops which occupied these buildings were from two 
battalions from Central and East Java, in town for the 
celebration of Armed Forces Doy on 5 October. Logistical 
support turned out to be perfunctory; the troops lacked 
commitment to the rebellion they were supposed to be 
spear-heading, and it was easy for officers under 
Suharto's command, later that day, to order them back to 
their barracks. 
But the plotters' for more serious blunder lay in their 
failure to include among their victims the general who 
would so speedily strike back and crush their moves to 
pre-empt a coup. That general was Suharto, KOS TRAD 
commander. Nor did they bother to occupy his 
headquarters, located on the some square as the other 
occupied buildings. Both Untung and Latief knew Suharto 
well, hod served long under him when he was commander of 
the Central Java Diponegoro Division, and had since 
retained close personal ties with the Suharto family. 
Supardjo had also served under Suharto. 
Latief in particular, then commander of a Jakarta 
infantry battalion, knew the strategic importance of 
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Suharto in 196.5. 
KOS'rRAD headquarters as he had recently led combined-
service exercises to test the capital's defences, and 
certainly knew that the most highly sophisticated 
communications system in Indonesia, recently purchased 
from the US, was located not at the telecommunications 
centre but across the square at KOSTRAD HQ [Anderson and 
McVey, ibid]. 
Not long ofter the kidnappings, Suharto left home and 
drove unmolested to his headquarters, passed buildings 
occupied by rebel troops, enjoying a free hand to launch 
his counter-otfensive. KOSTRAD was supremely well 
equipped to surround the rebels' headquarters at Halim 
airbase on the outskirts of Jakarta, to end the 
perfunctory occupations in Jakarta, and to launch on 
offensive against the PKI. Suharto ignored a decision by 
Sukarno later that day to appoint another general as 
caretaker of the army, in place of the murdered Yoni, and 
himself took command of the army. In terms of hierarchy, 
Suhcrto might hove expected Sukarno to put him in command 
(and so, incidentally, would Untung, Latief and Supardjo) 
but Sukarno did not do so. This did not deter Suharto who 
immediately launched a political and military offensive 
to demolish, step by step, the power base of Indonesia's 
first president. 
At the time, rowever, Suharto was not seen as a likely 
initiator of such drastic moves against Sukarno and the 
PKI. He had not cut his mark as an avowed anti-communist. 
Indeed, while divisional commander in Central Java, one 
of the PK I's strongest areas, he was not unsympathetic to 
the PK I and its mass organisations, occasionally 
lavishing gifts on them. Only later, after he had got 
himself appointed president did it emerge that, as 
KOSTRAD cx:mmcrde£ and commcrder of the oompaign against 
Malaysia, he was sabotaging the campaign and working 
systematically against Sukarno's interests. 
THE 1965 AFFAIR 
While other generals made no secret of their anti-PK I 
sentiments, Suharto kept his feelings to himself, 
steadily building up his base in the army, with both a 
strike force and an intelligence network at his disposal. 
As the ultimate beneficiary of what happened in October 
1965, he is not unnaturally the prime suspect. The men 
standing in his way to reach the top were his close 
colleagues on the army general staff, above al I General 
Yani, whose loyalty to Sukarno mode him reluctant to join 
any anti-PK I crusade. Suharto theretore had plenty of 
reasons to I iquidote the general stotf, especial I y if he 
could contrive to place the blame on the PK I. 
Suharto's midnight meeting with Latief 
There is plenty of damning evidence of Suharto's 
collusion with the army plotters. Around midnight on 1 
October, a few hours before the kidnap squads set out, 
Suharto met Lotief at the bedside of Suharto's son who 
was being treated for burns, a strange time for either 
men to visit a small boy in hospital. Suharto has 
acknowledged that this encounter took place, and was even 
the first to mention it in public, in an interview with 
US journalist, Arnold Brockman, he said Latief had come 
to the hospital to make sure he, Suharto, was too 
preoccupied with his son's health to respond to any move 
against the generals [Arnold Brockman, The Communist 
Collapse in Indonesia, 1969, page 100]. A year later, 
Suharto again mentioned the midnight meeting, claiming 
this time that Lotief hod come to the hospital to kill 
him but got scored at the lost moment [Der Spiegel, No. 
27, June I 970, page 98]. 
Why did Suharto feel the need to draw attention to this 
meeting? He knew trot many people were asking why he was 
not included on the list of kidnap victims, a fact that 
cast suspicion on him. He also knew that Latief was 
alive, locked up, and in the hands of generals with 
ambitions of their own, who might one day let Latief talk 
about the meeting. 
That was precisely what happened in 1978, when Lotief 
was brought to trial. In a defence document, a copy of 
which was later smuggled abroad, Latief spoke at length 
about several meetings he hod with Suharto and his wife, 
~LAC~~J l j 
.JL . MERDEl<it. UTA~"' 
s:= J ._ ~ ~ AA~ ~ ::> ~ I 
STATION i: k05,.~AD 
< [@ H.q . '!i < w Y. 
Q Ill 
!)( NATIONAL 0 
ul MO,.\J"'1!.NT ll{ 
I: UI 
~ ~ l: ..J , ..J ..., 
JL · ME.~DE.KA SELAT~N 
WZJ 
POST OF F1C.E. 
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troops on 1 October, but Kostrad headquarters was not. 
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just prior to 1 October. In fact, Lotief asked for the 
two of them to be col led as witnesses, but this was 
refused. In Lotief's words, he went to the hospital that 
night "not only to see his (Suharto's) son who hod hod on 
occident, but also to report that a movement would be 
launched on the following morning to prevent a coup 
d'etat by the Council of Generals, which he already knew 
about beforehand". Lotief went no further than this in 
implicating Suharto though he added that, since hundreds 
of thousands of people hod been incarcerated without 
trial for years for alleged involvement merely because 
they "must have known something" about the events of 1 
October, surely Suharto should have got at least the some 
punishment. 
Why did the PKI need a coup? 
Any orolysis of the events of October 1965 would need 
to consider the brooder political implications of what 
happened. Why, for instance, should the PK I, which 
enjoyed such widespread and growing popularity along with 
the protection of President Sukarno, hove wanted to 
become involved in a coup? A possible answer is that the 
party believed Sukarno was in failing health and was 
about to be deposed. This meant they wonted to head off 
such a calamity. Certainly, PK I leaders relied heavily on 
Sukarno, and hod confidence in what they regarded as 
"progressive officers" in the army, hoping perhaps that 
an inner-army struggle for power might demolish the anti-
communist element and release the party from the wove of 
repression waged against the party by some army officers. 
Although hardly anyone in the party, except for a few 
politbureou members, all of whom were murdered by the 
army soon ofter October 1965, knew anything about Aidit 
and Syom's Special Bureau, it does indeed seem that such 
a body existed. This was little short of playing with 
fire for a party that pinned its hopes on winning power 
through the ballot box, and had an excellent chance of 
doing so. But the crucial question is: was Aidit sending 
instructions through the Bureau and Syam to the 
"progressive officers" or was Syam feeding information to 
Aidit to convince him that "progressive officers" were 
preparing a strike against the general staff which it 
would be in Aidit's advantage to support? And if the 
latter is true, which part of army intelligence was 
feeding the information to Syam? Suharto hod his own 
intelligence apparatus, the unit known as Opsus (Special 
Operations) which had been operating under General Ali 
Murtopo, his intelligence officer since the days he 
commanded the Central Java division. 
Is Suharto's version coming unstuck? 
It is undeniably true that much of history is dictated 
by people like Suharto who emerge as victors. No effort 
has been spored in Indonesia to support Suharto's version 
of what happened in 1965. People hove been murdered, 
imprisoned, and judiciol ly executed, to uphold that 
version. But there ore signs that doubts ore spreading. 
There ore even signs, as we shol l show below, that some 
factions in the military may be trying to discredit the 
Suharto version. 
A writer in Solusi, a Jogjakarta journal published 
earlier this year by the local branch of HM I, the Muslim 
Students Association, wrote that "it is difficult to 
answer the question, who was responsible for the (October 
1965) movement". Superman Marzuki was reviewing The Army 
and Politics in Indonesia by Harold Crouch, the 
Political prisoners in Buru island prison comp, clearing 
the forest when the forced labour project was first 
opened. 
Indonesian translation of which was recently banned by 
the Attorney-General. Crouch cast doubt on the off ici?l 
version. According to Morzuk i, Crouch succeeded in 
showing that "one should not put the PK I in the dock, and 
should at the very least re-examine this profoundly 
shattering event". The reviewer goes on: "One conclusion 
of the many analyses mode of that coup attempt is that it 
was in fact only on internal army conflict, in pursuit of 
objectives that become evident in subsequent political 
manoeuvres". 
Turning from this genuine search for truth, there ore 
signs that top men in the regime may also be doing their 
bit to discredit Suharto over the October 1965 affair. It 
was in Sinor Horopon, less than two weeks before its 
demise, that an interview of three army generals 
appeared, discussing the evidence which, they soy, led 
the army to believe the PK I was involved. The three 
officers, all retired, are General Ali Said, now chairman 
of the Supreme Court who in 1965 was on army prosecutor 
and later choired several military tribunals; Mojor-
General Tahir, now Inspector-General of Development who 
in 1965 was deputy chairman of the army's Central 
Interrogation Team; and Durmowel Achmod, now I iving in 
retirement, who in 1965 was on army prosecutor and 
interrogator. 
Strange to say, they did not focus on the testimony of 
Syom who was executed three days earlier. In tact, Syom 
was not even mentioned until the lost two paragraphs of 
the final article reporting the interview. LSinor 
Haropan, 29 and 30 September 1986, and 1 October 1986J 
The evidence they chose to highlight was that of Nyono, 
Nyono, the first PKI leader to be tried. [Tempo, 11 
October 1986] 
8 T APOL Bulletin No. 78, December 1986 
General Ali Said, chairman of the Supreme Court. 
the first PK I leader to be tried after October 1965. They 
took ds their centre-piece a hand-written confession made 
by Nyono under interrogation by Durmawel, admitting that 
Aidit agreed to launch a movement to pre-empt a coup 
against Sukarno and that Aidit was given responsibility 
for 'military preparations'. 
Yet, the Ali Said-Tahir-Durmawel trio had a few 
confessions of their own to make, firstly that Nyono's 
'data' only "reinforced their belief or, more precisely, 
Two repatriated 
killed in 
refugees feared 
Merauke 
An alarming report hos been received of the murder in 
detention of two West Papuans who returned to Merauke 
after living for nearly 2 years in refugee camps in PN G. 
The two men are Ancelmus Katua, formerly headmaster of 
Mindiptanah secondary school, said to be an OPM 
supporter, and Clemens Andomenen, a school-teacher from 
lmko village, Mindiptanah, who previously fought with the 
OPM. 
According to o letter from Berncrd Mowen, OPM leader in 
the Merauke region, the two men returned with their 
families in June this year under a repatriation scheme 
backed by the UN High Commission for Refugees. Kalua 1-od 
been in KaTiopdn refugee CQ'TIP and Anchnenen in Kuiu camp. 
Mowen said the men were arrested within weeks of their 
return and held at the 1707 military command in Merauke 
where they were severely tortured, eventually dying as 
the result of electric shock. [Weekend Australian, 8-9 
November 1986]. 
Any chance of obtaining independent confirmation of the 
two men's torture and death is remote. Indonesia refuses 
to allow either the UNHCR or the International Red Cross 
access to areas where repatriated refugees are 1 iving, 
for purposes of monitoring their circumstances. Foreign 
Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmaja reiterated this refusal 
while visiting Port Moresby for the signing of the 
ildonesian-PNG Friendship Treaty [Australian Financial 
Review, 30 October]. 
229 more refugees repatriated 
According to Indonesian press reports, 229 West Papuan 
refugees returned to Indonesia at the end of October, 
from Kungm I and Atkamba refugee camps. Kompas, 8 
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their intuitiCJ'l that the PK I masterminded the rebellion". 
They also admitted that Nyono's testimony gave the 
impression that the army plotters had acted on their own 
initiative. Thirdly, and most damaging for Suharto, they 
admitted that, in court, Nyono retracted the whole 
confession, saying instead that the PK I had decided to 
leave the entire matter of coup and counter-coup to 
President Sukarno. They even went to the trouble of 
spelling out Nyono's testimony in court. 
Having done nothing to conceal the controversial nature 
of Nyono's evidence, one can only conclude that the three 
law officers intended to convey a message contradicting 
the stated aim of the interview. How does one interpret 
this rather strange twist? And is there reason to believe 
that by publishing the interview, Sinor Harapan drove 
another nail into its own cotfin? 
Ali Said, recognised for many years as an ally of 
General Sudharmono, and port of what is loosely tolled 
the AHM (Military Law Academy) taction, hos been 
suspected in the past of causing Suharto quite a few 
headaches through the law courts. He was responsible tor 
bringing Latief to trial in 1978. In the same year, 
damning evidence was produced in another trial about Ali 
Said's so-called dossier on Suharto. So, is Ali Said 
stirring up trouble again? 
WEST PAPUAN REFUGEES 
--~------~---~----------~-------
November, reports that those originating from Merauke 
wi 11 be placed in transmigration sites around Merauke, 
while those from Mindiptanah and Waropka will go back to 
their villages. 
Indonesian officials from Mochtar down consistently 
claim that 5,000 West Papuan refugees have returned home, 
leaving only 5,000 in PNG camps. These figures are 
refuted by al 1 other sources. 
Tile second eaition of TAPQ's well-received book is still 
available. Order your copy now. 
Price: £3.50 including postage - l.K, Europe and overseas 
surface: 
£5.00 including postage - airmail worldwide. 
Special rates for bulk orders. 
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Military operations in West Papua 
Hore reports of clashes between Indonesian tIOops and 0 PM (Free Papua Hove m ent) guerrillas have recently been received, 
confirming earlier reports, published by TAPCL, of a major Indonesian operation, code·-named Operasi Sate, now under way. 
The latest reports come from the OP M and are verified by an independent source w/:lich cannot be identified. 
In March 1986, Brigadier-General Setiyana was appointed 
commander of the Vlllth/Trikora Military Command, 
replacing Major-General Simanjuntak who held the post 
little more than a year. Setiyana was previously chief-
of-staff of the Vth/Brawijaya Military Command in East 
Java. Under the re-organisation of the army, the Trikora 
Military Command covers Maluku as well as Irion Joya. 
Operations in north-east Jayapura district 
According to the OPM, troop reinforcements from the 
Pattimura Division in Maluku, from the Engineers Corps 
and from the Brawijoya Division in East Java, were moved 
into the district in March 1986, to cope with escalating 
OPM operations. 
Fierce fighting occurred in Marcil 1986, with four men 
of a Pattimura battalion being killed. The bodies were 
flown out by helicopter, while OPM seized their weapons. 
The location of this clash is not given. 
Also in March, a fierce battle took place in Pontai 
Timur sub-district. OPM claim to hove k i lied 36 soldiers 
but do not mention their own casuolt ies. 
Not long afterwords, the koram i 1 (mi 1 i tary command) 
post and pol ice post of Betof, on the north coast, were 
destroyed and occupied for one hour by OPM guerri I las. 
Seven Indonesian soldiers escaped and hid in a house. 
They were later discovered by the OPM and shot dead. 
Their weapons were confiscated. 
On 28 Apri 1, the security forces initiated an Operasi 
Tumpas in the provincial capital, Jayapura, during which 
Papuan government employees were rounded up, detained and 
interrogated. Some were severely beaten up. 
In early May, another fierce battle occurred during 
which no fewer than 60 Indonesian soldiers are said to 
have lost their lives. A sub-district official and staff 
member were token hostage by the OPM. 
Flog-raising 
On two occasions, the West Papuan flag was raised in 
Jayapura city. The first was on Sunday 4 May, when the 
flag was raised in front of Loka Budaya Building, 
formerly the New Guinea Council building. The flag 
remained in place for several hours. People on their way 
to morning service at Harapan Church saw the incident. 
The second flag-raising was late at night on t4 May, in 
front of the Radio Indonesia building. The flag remained 
up ti II next morning. In both cases, the groups who 
rai5ed the flags got away. 
In May, armed clashes took place between the OPM and 
Indonesian troops in un area close to the PN G border. An 
army truck carrying troops was fired on, and soldiers 
were killed as they jumped out. Following the incident, 
local inhabitants were taken away for interrogation. 
Several people disappeared and two are known to hove 
died: Janteloga (Jan Telogo?) and John Tabuni. 
More clashes have since occurred. Medical staff at the 
Jayapura General Hospital say that many bodies of 
Indonesian soldiers have arrived at the morgue. Wounded 
soldiers are quickly returned to their units and replaced 
by other troops. 
In mid-August, F-5 Tiger aircraft carried out a series 
of aerial attacks lasting four days, to smash Markos 
Victoria, the OPM headquarters. [Markos Victoria is 
mobile.] The target was not hit but widespread damage was 
inflicted on the surrounding countryside. 
A kampung named Olmape (exoct location not clear) was 
burnt down, destroying 65 homes and the local church. The 
vi JI agers fled into the bush, chased by troops. Some were 
shot dead while others took refuge in the jungle. 
Strategic village control 
The OPM report describes restrictions on villagers 
throughout the northern coastal region, strikingly 
similar to those imposed on the inhabitants of strategic 
villages in East Timor (see page 18). 
As operations intensified earlier this year, all 
kampungs and vi I loges along the north coast and inland 
were inundated with Indonesian troops. This move cut the 
OPM's lines of communications, making it more difficult 
to keep abreast of developments. Many vi l logers, 
including village officials, were arrested and questioned 
for information about OPM positions. Many were beaten up 
or tortured; the women were raped. 
With a strong army presence, villagers and kampung 
dwellers throughout the district have been subjected to 
constant harassment and control, restricting their access 
to food production and gathering. When supplies run out, 
they are allowed out of their kompungs only under escort, 
to gather sweet potato and sago, and hove to return home 
fast. People wishing to go to town by boat or road can 
only go under guard. Even family visits have been curbed 
because of restrictions on freedom of assembly and 
speech. Troops insist on being present, and require 
people to converse only in Indonesian. 
Operations in Merauke district 
Several clashes have also been reported in Waropka sub-
district, Merouke. This is far inland and borders with 
Papua New Guinea. On 17 July, OPM guerrillas were fired 
on by Indonesian troops as they were out gathering food 
outside a kampu~ named Maigklbun Tua. They were not able 
to return to base until 6 August. 
On 23 August, there was a five-hour bottle between OPM 
and Indonesian forces. One Indonesian soldier was k i lied 
but all OPM fighters escaped without serious injury 
though some were grazed by bullets. Six days later, on 29 
August, there was a ten-hour battle in Mongkubun Loma. 
Once most ·of the guerrillas' bows and arrows had been 
destroyed by gunfire, they dispersed without loss. 
In on incident on 29 September, a guerrilla named 
Stephan Baket was shot and mortally wounded. Other 
incidents around this time include helicopter sorties 
against the guerrillas in Waropka. In some instances, the 
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FiSO£ Yariselouw, who was arrested in P~ New Guinea in 
November this yeor. He is described by PN G Times [14 
November 1986) as ''the longest-serving OPM guerrilla". 
vPM claim, helicopters flew over the PNG border. 
The area of these engagements is close to Wiwirok, 
where a Catholic catechist was beheaded and five men were 
shot dead in March this year, leading to an exodus from 
the area. Around 750 West Papuans later crossed the 
border into PNG and were givoen refuge in Yapsiei comp. 
Foreign journalists 
OP M attack by 
miss an 
minutes 
Foreign correspondents on a guided tour of Ir i an J aya 
province (West Papua) were unexpectedly able to report on 
an attack on the Indonesian military by the Free Papua 
Movement (OPM) which happened only minutes before they 
arrived at the village of Arso Kota, east of the 
provincial capital, Jayapura. An Indonesian was killed 
and another injured in the attack. 
At official briefings before setting out for Arso Kota, 
the journalists had been told the OPM was "finished" and 
Village pastor 
A village pastor named Yafeth Suri was shot and severely 
wounded by lndooesian troops during a military operation 
in the sub-district of Sarm i in August this year. 
The shooting occurred on 15 August, as Pastor Suri was 
paddling his canoe across a 15-metre wide river. He was 
returning home to Muaif Kampung, Denta, after going to 
visit to another section of his congregation, to take the 
Sunday collection from the deacon. 
On that day, military operations were under way in 
Muoif, as part of operations in Donggo, in the Sarmi sub-
district. Houses were searched for OPM guerrillas or 
sympathisers. Soldiers confiscated suspect items like 
kitchen knives, bush knives, axes and bows and arrows. 
As Pastor Suri was rowing back, soldiers standing on 
the bank yelled out, saying: "Where are you going? Come 
over here." He rowed towards them, shouting to explain 
that he was a teacher of religion at Muoif Kampung. When 
he was about 7 metres from the bank, a soldier opened 
fire, hitting him in the upper arm. 
WEST PAPUA 
--------
had launched no attacks since 1984. 
Peter Hiett of the BBC said local officials were thrown 
into confusion by the attack. Asked how frequently 
attacks took place, the local police chief at first said, 
"often", but changed his reply to "not often" after 
consulting other officials. Hiett said the station they 
visited was well fortified and armed. "Such facts suggest 
that the OPM is a substantially greater force in these 
areas near the border with Papua New Guinea - where the 
OPM is believed to have its bases - than the authorities 
would have us believe." [BBC Despatch, 28 October] 
The main aim of the trip by 13 foreign correspondents 
was to give them a guided tour of transmigration sites in 
West Papua, attempting to contradict foreign criticism of 
the transmigration programme. Hiett added that after the 
attack, Indonesian officials were reluctant to toke them 
to a second transmigration site and "there was one 
particular vi II age on the way back to Jayapura that they 
did not want to pass through in the dark". 
Famine strikes again 
in Jayawijaya 
According to official Indonesian reports, 84 people have 
died recently in the Kurima district, in the central 
highlands of West Papua as a result of food shortages. 
Most of the dead are said to be children under 5 and 
elderly people. The region has been hit by a severe 
drought, according to Albert Dien, district head of 
Jayawijaya. He admits that the area affected has a 
population of about 17 thousand people. 
Antora reports say that relief efforts "are hampered by 
the remoteness of the area, the lack of transportation 
and suitable personnel". 
The BBC's Peter Hiett reported the news from Jakarta, a 
few weeks after his trip to the area, along with other 
foreign journalists, during which he heard nothing of the 
disaster. 
This is third time in the post four years that famine 
and death has struck the district of Kurima, In November 
1984, at least 200 people died of starvation and disease, 
while two years previously, at least a hundred died of 
similar causes. [TAPOL Bulletin, No 66, November 1984, 
page 12] On those occasions, only the briefest of news 
was received about the disaster, nor was there any 
attempt to investigate the real causes of starvation in a 
region which, prior to Indonesian administration, was 
undisturbed by such calamities. 
severely wounded 
According to witnesses, the soldiers stood laughing as 
the wounded churchman fell back into his canoe, which 
began to sink. Villagers who were near the river rushed 
to his assistance, and dragged him out of the water. They 
reported the incident to the local military command. On 
17 August, two of the Pastor's children went to Jayapura 
to report the incident. But it was not till 19 August 
•hot arrangements were mode to toke him to Jayapura 
Hospital, by which time his wound was badly infested. 
According to Robin Osborne in PNG Times, 24 October, 
Pastor Suri died five days later, though other sources 
which provided most of the above information could not 
confirm that. 
It is understood a formal complaint resulted in a 
promise by the army to take proceedings against the 
soldier responsible for shooting the churchman. Whether 
anyone is punis.hed for this crime, the fact remains that 
Pastor was a victim of the military operations now under 
way in Irion Joya. 
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East Timorese students stranded in Jakarta 
Four East Timcxese students who entered the Dutch Embassy 
in Jokorto on 20 October, osked for politicol osylum ond 
opplied for documents to go to Portugal, were forced to 
leove the Embossy three days loter. They ore still in 
Jokorto, ot the mercy of the lndonesion outhorities, 
woiting for the necessory documents ond oir-tickets to be 
oble to leove lndonesio. 
Two of the students were omong three students who were 
picked up in September by elite K opossus troops, ond he Id 
for obout o month. They ore Antonino Goncalves and Jooo 
do Camorq. arrested on 3 and 16 September respectively. 
They were released on 11 October. Both are students of 
low ot the Catholic Atma Joyo University in Jakarta. The 
-other two who sought asylum are Fernando Soares, also an 
Atma Joya student, md Abilio Sereno, who studies at the 
Pancasilo University. They share the same house as 
Goncalves and do Camara, and were questioned by security 
forces at the time of their friends' detention. 
Dutch betrayal 
The four entered the Dutch Embassy, believing the Dutch 
outhorities would grant them temporary asylum while 
arrangements were made for them to obtoin Portuguese 
passports and leave the country. Since Portugal broke off 
diplomatic. relations with Jokarta when Indonesia invoded 
Eost Timor in December 1975, the Dutch Embassy hos 
hondled consular affoirs for Portugal ond hos issued 
around 3,000 Portuguese passports to East Timorese 
wonting to leave the country. 
In 1984, the Dutch Embassy granted protect ion to four 
West Papuan students who had sought osylum, and arranged 
their deporture to Holland. Even so, the Dutch Government 
hos ovoided granting them political refugee status, as 
this would acknowledge that politicol persecution of 
Popuons exists in lndonesio. 
This time, the Dutch succumbed more easily to 
Indonesian pressure. After negotiotions between the 
Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumoatmojo, ond 
the Dutch Foreign Minister, Hans von der Broek, who was 
FOU" West Popun; who took refuge in the Duh::h Errix&sy in 
February 1984 were sofely escorted to the airport by 
Dutch diplomats. [Sinar Harapan, 14 March 1984] 
delighted to hove extricated themselves from an 
"emborrossing" incident. The Dutch Government wrote to 
the Indonesian Government thonking them for "peocefully 
settling the case" [ Jakarta Post, 25 October]. According 
to both Dutch and Indonesian officials, there is no need 
for the students to seek political asylum. 
Portugal's response 
For several weeks, the Portuguese government avoided 
saying whether or not they would issue passports to the 
students. Following a letter on 10 November to the 
Portuguese Foreign Minister, Pires de Mirando, who was on 
a visit to London, T APOL was told by the Portuguese 
Embassy in London that Portugal instructed the Dutch 
E mbossy on 25 October to issue passports and purchase 
air-tickets. The Embassy said the stumbling-block 
preventing the students' departure is Indonesia's 
insistence that they need exit visas to leave Indonesia. 
In a second letter to the Foreign Minister Pires de 
Mi rondo on 12 November, T APOL coiled this exit visa 
requirement unacceptable. People who hold EEC passports, 
which now include the Portuguese, do not need entry or 
exit visas. Moreover, "the students ore leaving Indonesia 
to evade persecution and ore seeking political asylum .... 
There surely can be no precedent for such on incongruous 
situation, where persons wishing to flee their country of 
persecution ore dependent on the goodwi 11 of the 
government of that country in order to be able to 
leove ... " 
Background to the students' persecution 
According to the Indonesian press, Goncalves and do 
Comara were arrested in September for possessing fire-
arms, and were released because the security authorities 
hod decided not to bring any chorges. The men ore said to 
be former Portuguese soldiers who went over to Fretilin 
in 1975 and fought with the resistance until they 
surrendered in the late 1970s. They subsequent 1 y got jobs 
with the East Timor provincial administration and 
obtained scholarships to study law in Jakarta. 
in lndaiesio to attend o meetillJ of EEC end A$EAN fcreign 
ministers, the E mbossy staff warned the students that if 
they did not leave 'voluntarily', the Indonesian police 
would be coiled to take them out. 
The four students were removed with the assistance of 
Gerard Bonong, Rector of Atmo Joya University, whose 
appearance at the E mbossy reinforced the impression 
Mochtar wos determined to create, that the students hod 
nothing to fear, and that they could return to their 
studies without hindrance. 
A week later, the students mode two more attempts to 
enter the E mbossy but were kept out by I ndonesion pol ice 
on guard outside. On their second attempt, a Dutch 
diplomat met them at the door but did not allow them to 
enter. They ore now staying at the home of a former 
Indonesian-appointed governor of East Timor, Guilhermo 
Goncalves, Antonino's uncle, where they hove received 0 
number of threatening phone-coils. 
Meanwhile, the Dutch and Indonesian governments ore 
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Their release would not necessarily mean that they have 
nothing more to fear. It is most unlikely that people 
publicly spoken of as former Fretilin supporters can 
expect to live, either in Jakarta or Dili, free of 
constant political harassment, if not re-arrest. 
There are hundreds of East Tlmorese now studying in 
Java and only recently, several were praised as model 
students in the Indonesian press [Jakarta Post, 30 July]. 
This was around the time of the tenth anniversary of 
integration when the East Timor Student Association was 
put in charge of 'celebrations' in Jakarta to mark the 
anniversary. 
The ifll>ression that the military are suspicious of East 
Timorese students is reinforced by the arrest of two 
students home on leave in Dili, along with about 100 
other arrests in East Timor. The two had returned to 
Dili, with many other students, to take part in the 
government-sponsored celebration of the 10th anniversary 
of integration. 
The two students are: Domingos ~ira Smmento, a law 
student at UK I, the Christian University of Indonesia, 
and Germano do Silva, a student at LAN, the Public 
Administration Institute. After being in communicado, 
then in Comarca Prison, Di Ii, Sarmento was released and 
returned to Jakarta. Da Silva is still in detention. 
-
Visits allowed 
The Indonesian military authorities are extremely 
selective about the people they allow to visit East 
Tlmor. They have turned down a request from the UK 
Parliamentary Human Rights Group and the Australian 
Parliament's Amnesty Section to visit East Timor, even 
though in July this year, a Portuguese parliamentarian, 
Miguel Anocoreta Correia, was given permission to enter 
the territory and provided with facilities to visit nine 
locations, travelling most of the time by helicopter. 
Anocoreta Correia of the Christion Democrat party, CDS, 
is vice-chairperson of the Parliamentary Commission on 
East Timor. He visited East Timar in July on the 
invitation of Indonesian Armed Forces com111C11der, General 
Benny Murdani. The visit did not get the official backing 
of the Portuguese Parliament and went ahead only as a 
private visit, not representing Parliament. 
Anacoreta Correia strongly favours the preservation of 
Portuguese cultural traditions in East Timor. He has 
business interests in Macao, the other remaining 
Portuguese territory in Asia. Generali y speaking, parties 
on the ridit in Portugal, including the CDS, have opposed 
Indonesia's takeover of East Timor and retain a paternal 
interest in Portugal's former colonial subjects. Before 
his departure for Indonesia and East Timor, the 
parliamentarian said one of his aims was to help improve 
relations between Portugal and Indonesia. He also wanted 
to see what had become of Portuguese monuments (sic) and 
other vestiges of Portuguese culture. 
A face-saving device for Portugal 
The more interesting thing about the vis it is to assess 
General Murdani's aims in encouraging Anacoreta Correia 
to go, the first time a Portuguese MP has been allowed 
in. Murdani held two one-hour discussions with Anacoreta 
Correia, one before an:l one after his East T imor trip. On 
the first occasion, Murdani complained about the highly 
EAST Tl MOR 
and disallowed 
critical 1983 visit by Portuguese TV journalist, Rui 
Araujo which, he said, had closed the door to dialogue. 
(Araujo published a plea for help and a list of names 
from the prisoners in Atauro island which was secretly 
handed to him. See TAPOL Bulletin, No 57, May 1983, p 1.) 
Later, the East Timar governor, Mario Carroscalao was 
also frank about the regime's selectivity on visitors. 
Future visits will be allowed, he told Correia, if the 
previous visits produce "something positive" towards the 
solution of the East Timor problem, especially regarding 
the position of Portugal. Future visits will be 
impossible if previous visits produce "bod results". 
The main point that emerged from the first Correia-
Murdani meeting was Murdani's offer to Portugal of a 
"face-saving device", given the fact that Portugal 
administered East Timor for almost 500 years. When, at 
their second meeting, Anacoreto Correia said Portugal's 
posit ion takes into account that the population of East 
Timor must be consulted about their future, Murdoni 
stressed that elections will be held next year and that 
Indonesia is planning to invite UN observers and other 
personalities to witness the elections. This presumably 
is Murdani's "face-saving device", not a referendum but a 
show that the Timorese, by voting in the elections, have 
thrown in their lot with Indonesia. 
Throughout his five-day visit, Anocoreta Correia was 
acCOfll>Gnied by naval Captain Yusuf E fendi, a member of 
Murdani's special cabinet, who never left his side. 
"A traumatized population" 
The Portuguese parliamentarian issued a lengthy report 
on his visit. Sizeable sections represent little more 
than an uncritical repetition of what Indonesian 
officials told him, yet occasionally, he gives a picture 
of on unhappy population, unwilling to accept Indonesian 
control. Negative remarks are quickly followed by 
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The mCl"l in charge of 
operations in East 
Timer, Genet-al Ben1y 
Murdani. 
something more positive, however, as if there is a 
conscious attempt at achieving ''balance". 
The following are some points from the report: 
* He complains of excessive security forces surrounding 
him, which intimidated people who would hove liked to 
talk but dare not do so. Yet, he says that he was not 
hindered and there were no restrict ions. 
* Me described Dili as a thriving town, with plenty of 
goods available in the markets. Money flows freely and 
Dili is a duty-free zone with goods directly shipped in 
from Singapore. Javanese occupy oil important positions 
while T imorese cannot compete ''because of their 
passivity". He describes the population as being 
"traumatized" by the civil war (sic) from 1974 and 1976, 
and soys he heard many stories of persecution. 
* Lospolos is described as "peaceful", and its churches 
overflowing though he was there only a few hours. 
[Lospalos is on area of frequent guerri I la attacks.] 
* Outside Dili, he sow almost no men of medium age, but 
he does not attempt to give any explanation for this 
disturbing fact. 
* Observing that Portuguese monuments are intact, that 
Portuguese street names have been preserved and that East 
Timorese continue to practice Portuguese folklore, he 
drew the conclusion that there is no cultural genocide. 
" His complaints about the absence of normal postal links 
with East Ti mor led Governor Carrasco loo to odm it there 
were problems, though he did not know the cause. The best 
solution, said Carroscolao, is to tell people to send 
letters to him and he will forward them. 
" Statistics show that more than 100,000 Timorese have 
died due to armed action or its direct consequences. He 
said he did not meet anyone who had not lost family 
members. 
* The International Red Cross has had only one 
representative in East Timor for the past 18 months. She 
told him that for considerable periods she was not 
allowed to go anywhere outside Dili and Atauro. 
" He obtained informot ion about the mi I itary si tuotion 
only from the military commander, Colonel Yosfiah, who 
told him the guerrillas only attack civilians at night to 
obtain food. Yet thePortuguese MP was not permitted to 
contact the resistance "for security reasons". 
" He said General Murdani had told him he was in charge 
of operations in East Timor 
No apparent effect 
Anacoreta Correia' s report to Parliament appears to 
have had no effect on Portugal's position. It may be, 
however, that his personal view of conditions which 
offers little criticism of Indonesia's record, could 
affect Portuguese official thinking and win support for 
Murdani's "face-saving" solution. If Murdani has 
succeeded in convincing the MP that Portuguese traditions 
ore safe in his hands, the question of self-determination 
could be allowed to toke second place. 
Military censorship in West Timor 
A Jakarta-based Japanese journalist who visited West 
Timor recently came face to face with military 
censorship in West Timor. On a visit to K upang, the 
capital of West Timor, he decided to visit Atombuo, 
near the border with East Timor. He mode the 200-km 
trip from Kupang by bus, took a room in a small 
hote I, and was soon warned by the hote 1 owner that, 
according to m iii tary regulations, "foreigners are 
permitted to move about only within a five kilometer 
radius of the centre of the town". Two days earlier, 
on English couple had been detained by the army for 
going outside the town and ordered to return to 
Kupang. 
"Sure enough, the next morning, a man showed up at 
the hotel who appeared to be a plainclothes security 
officer and took me to the district command. After 
being asked a number of questions by the military, I 
was ordered to leave immediately." [Yomiuri Shimbun, 
11 September 1986] 
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Fretilin report on human rights abuses 
The following is a slightly abridged version of a report compiled in April this year by Kay Rala Gusmao Xanana, chairman 
of the Revolutionary Council of National Resistance. The document reached Lisbon in mid July. 
While Indonesia systematically attempts to deny it, the 
persecution of the people of East Timor continues. Our 
people are in shackles. They compare themselves to 
chickens threatened with the knife, knowing that their 
throats could be slit any minute. 
Any lists we supply on massacres, disappearances, 
imprisonment and torture will necessarily be incomplete. 
With the population under constant surveillance, it is 
difficult to ascertain the exact number of victims. 
Moreover, some people are constantly being summoned, 
going in and out of prison. 
The difficulty of maintaining contact with the outside 
world and problems regarding internal communications mean 
that our denunciations always lag behind events. This 
obliges us to be selective, using only incidents of the 
greatest interest, involving a large number of people. 
Murders, arrests and beatings 
1. On 14 Decerrber 1985, troops of the 516th Battalion in 
Kaikoli/Venilale murdered Arminda, 55 and Marcos, 17, 
both from Lua-chi village in the district of Uatohako. 
2. On 19 January 1986, nanggala troops (men of the elite 
corps, Kopassus) in Kelikai captured Luis Moria da Silva, 
44, a village head, and three others, all from Mu-
Mana/Wai-Tame, as well as six villagers from Abafala. 
They were all subjected to brutal violence at the Kelikai 
military command until 2 February, when they were moved 
to Comarca prison in Dili, where they ore still held. 
3. Members of the 643rd Battalion detached to Nahareka 
have violently persecuted people in the region. On 8 
February, four people from the village of Roi La'a and 
five people from the vi Hage of Dare Nau, were brutally 
beaten up in front of the rest of the population. 
4. On 20 January, the local military officer (babinsa) 
of Salaman/Baucau, a soldier named Otamy from the 411 th 
Battalion, brutally beat up seven people from the village 
of Ossu Luga. 
5. In reprisal for two guerrilla operations in the 
vicinity of Vikeke and Nohareka, troops of Company 4 
nanggalas captured four people from the vii loges of 
Samarago, Dore Nau and Roi Lo'a; 12 people, including two 
children aged 10 and 3, and a 7-month old baby, from the 
village of Karau Bolu; ten people from the sub-district 
of Uma' in Kraik; as well as a 2-yeor old child from the 
sub-district of Monumento. 
A 11 except three were transferred to Boucou district 
command on 19 Morch. The three were subjected to violent 
interrogation, including electric shock treatment. They 
were held held in one room, sleeping on the floor without 
sleeping-mats or blankets, with no change of clothing as 
they were picked up from their fields and had nothing 
except the rags they were wearing. Sudden arrests like 
this prevent people from fleeing into the bush. 
For food, they get a conch-ful of rice, but because 
they get rice, the Indonesians claim the prisoners are 
eating better than at home. This is true because people 
Para-commandos of the Kopossus unit arriving for one 
their numerous special operations. 
in the villages con only eat 'moek' which is usually food 
only fit for pigs. 
Disappearances 
In August last year, nanggala. troups and Vikeke 
district command (kodim) troops carried out sweeps in a 
number of sub-districts in Vikeke, causing consternation 
among the population. They raided many homes late at 
night and captured a number of people, whisking them oil 
away to unknown destinations. By the end of February this 
year, no contact had yet been made, and they were then 
regarded as 'missing'. (The report lists the names of 12 
missing people. Three people on the I ist are residential 
·chiefs (R K or RT) and one is a member of the police.) 
Death from starvation 
The report also provides data about the spread of 
disease, on indication of the economic state of people 
living under Indonesian occupation: 
1. From December 1985 to Februay 1986, there were more 
than 500 coses of influenza in Boucou affecting primarily 
children aged 1 - 5. There were many deaths. 
2. In February 1986, there was over 80 coses of ulcers 
in Baguio, affecting children, adults and the aged. The 
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number of coses increased because of lock of treatment. 
When people asked for medicine, the troops retorted: 
"Don't bother us, our soldiers ore dying in the jungle." 
Measles epidemic 
3. The report lists a number of people who died from 
starvation and/or disease. In Kelikai, 15 men, 25 women 
and 29 children died in January and February this year. 
Eight men, 7 women and 25 children died in Samolon 
Baucau. Seventy people, adults and children died in Gari 
Uii, Boucou, from December 1985 to February 1986. Five 
people in Lere Loho, Lospalos died of measles, including 
a one-month old child. In lrora, Lospalos, four died in 
the some month of measles. Not long ago, there were 20 
victims of the some disease in the some sub-district, so 
the disease hod evidently spread because of lock of 
counter-measures. 
In Boduro, Serelou and Moina 11, there were 35 deaths 
from measles in December lost year, and many more may 
hove died since, including children, as, when data for 
the report was collected, many people were close to 
death. 
In Maluro, Lore, the level of starvation got so bad 
that the Indonesian occupiers felt obliged to distribute 
food. But some of it was moldy, with the result that a 
man aged 41, a woman aged 29 and her three-month old 
bcDy, and another woman aged 42, died of food poisoning. 
* * * * * 
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'Released' from Atauro 
but detained again 
More information hos been received in Lisbon about the 
fate of political deportees who were 'released' from 
Atouro island ofter being held there for four years. In 
1982, around 4,000 people were deported to the i slond 
from various ports of East Timor at the height of the 
1981-82 campaign against the resistance. Many of the 
Atauro deportees were family groups. 
The authorities frequently claim that Atouro is due to 
be closed down, and cloi m that maiy of the deportees have 
already been allowed home. Information from East Timor 
shows that to be a fabrication: 
* A list of 149 ex-Atouro deportees hos been received. 
Forty ore now being held in Aiserimou, and the other 109 
ore being held in Mono Toni. Both places ore _in Aileu, 
south of Dili. 
* In Holikou, between Coiloco and Moliono, near the 
border with West Timor, there ore now known to be eighty 
out of 132 people who were arrested in Moliono in 1983-
84. The other fifty were shot dead. Holikou prison comp 
is believed to accommodate between two and three thousand 
detainees. 
* Ex-Atouro detainees originolly from Some and Ainoro 
who hove been ollo.ved to return home from Atouro now find 
themselves worse off than before, under the pressure of 
m ii itory officers charged to keep control of them. 
* Many former detainees from Atouro were rearrested in 
August this year in Ainoro, then token to Di l i. Some hove 
disappeared, including Jose Ramos, Jooo Xavier, Moises 
Xavier and Manuel Araujo. 
* Another group of ex-Atouro prisoners were arrested in 
Aileu, were also taken to Dili, and hove disappeared. 
* An ex-prisoner named Antonio Moloe was severely 
beaten by on Indonesian soldier on the Loao Meiro bridge 
in Dili. He died later in hospital. 
* In the last week of August, Indonesian troops 
encircled a church in Atsabe, near the border with West 
Ti mor, as the congregot ion were at prayer. Six were 
arrested and alleged to have received a letter from 
Antonino Goncalves, a student in J okorto (see separate 
item), urging them "to toke up arms and rejoin the 
guerrillas". They were token to Jogjakarta in Central 
Java and interrogated under torture, Only one of these 
has been identified, Mario do Silva, formerly in the 
Indonesian police force. 
* On 13 September at 9 om, military vehicles arrived in 
Dili from the east and delivered 17 prisoners to Comorca. 
More prisoners arrived there the some afternoon. 
* Political detainees who have recently been released 
from Comorco Pr.Ison ore required to report to their local 
military command ooc:e a week. Others \\ho were released in 
1984, must report once a month. 
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Fretilin's map of Lautem 
In the last T APOL Bulletin, we published details of the 
situation in and around Lospalos, reproduced from a map 
received earlier this year from the Fretilin leadership 
inside East Timor. Fretilin had superimposed the details 
onto o topographical map of the eastern sector captured 
from the Indonesian army in December lost year. 
This time, we hove token another section of the mop 
showing the area along the rood from Loutem in the west 
to Tutuolu in the east. The mop, to o scale of 1 
centimetre to 500 metres, provides very information about 
concentration comps, food gathering and growing areas CRld 
Fretilin guerrilla bases, as well as information about 
guerrilla attacks during the 29 months from August 1983 
to December 1985. 
Fretilin leaders have nicknamed the area the 'Talisman 
Sub-region', for it hos always been o stronghold of the 
resistaice movement. As the area where Fretilin commander 
Xonano Gusmoo is believed to operate, it is now o focus 
of the current Indonesian offensive, with 12 botollions 
now under instructions to capture Xonono. 
The strategic villages 
Our present map identifies 16 inhabited areas which the 
inhabitants coll concentration comps. They ore in effect 
strategic villages and ore oil heavily guarded by troops. 
The 16 comps ore each inhabited by people who were 
uprooted from their native regions where they lived in 
widely dispersed hamlets. The mop describes in detail 
which people live in which comps (numbered as in mop): 
1, for people from Tei Moro and Titi Loxi. 
2 and 3, for people from Assolaino. 
4, for people from Luoroi, though largely abandoned since 
November 1983. 
5, for people from Txoi Luturo. 
6, for people from Bouro. 
7, also for people from Bouro. Largely abandoned since 
August 1984. 
8, for people from lrolofai. 
9, for people from Sepeloto and Loi Kora. 
10, for people from Somotxo. 
11, for people from Poros and Meara. 
12 and 13, for people from Mehoro. 
14 and 15, for people from Porlomono. 
16, for people from Luoroi. 
The comps hove been set up along the rood, conforming 
with Indonesia's strategic needs. The comps consist of 
housing for the .inhdlitonts aid ,gardens to grow food. The 
garden areas vary greatly, in some coses extending for 
about 1 kilometre, in others just o few hundr'ed metres. 
Some comps have land where food-gathering is possible. 
To make up for the lock of food, inhabitants in some 
comps ore allowed to go out once o month, under armed 
escort, to areas where food was formerly cultivated, and 
where certain fruits and edible roots con still be 
gathered. When food shortages are particularly severe, 
the military may allow camp-dwellers o second trip in the 
month. Conversely, when guerrilla activities intensify, 
the monthly trip may be cancelled. 
The four external food-gathering sites available to 
comps in the area of our mop ore marked A (for comps 5, 6 
and 7), B (for camp 8), C (for comp 9) and D (for comp 
Civilians livirg in on area of East Timor which is under 
Fretilin control. This is one of many photos received 
from Fretilin earlier this year. 
11). Thus, people living in the other ten comps hove 
nothing but what they con grow or gather within the 
boundaries of their comp. 
The food grown or gathered by villagers is largely 
confined to the following: coconuts, kumbili {sweet 
potatoes), mangos, kuon (on edible root), koto moruk 
(beans), kulu (bread fruit) and o few vegetables. 
The villagers ore occasionally allowed to go in groups 
under mi Ii tory escort to o nearby town for the purposes 
of selling garden products for cash, to buy clothes and 
other necessities. 
The confinement of East Timorese villagers to comps hos 
drastically reduced their access to land, making food 
production precarious. As one analyst of the Fretilin mop 
hos pointed out, speaking of the mop as a whole, the 
population in this region which was dispersed over on 
area of 1,700 square kilometres before the Indonesian 
invasion, is now confined to about 70 square kilometres, 
~ss than 5 per cent of the total land area [ Em Timor-
Leste o Paz e Possivel, No 17, October 1986). 
Guerrilla operations 
Most of the guerrilla units in this sector ore from the 
First Autonomous Compcriy. They operate from five areas or 
bases, shown in our mop as unshaded ovals, four in the 
north and one in the south. Three ore named - Sokolo, 
Puluro and Nono Foe - while the other two hove no names. 
Two regular Folintil companies, the Eastern Guerrilla 
Compmy and Unit I of Company A, also operate in this 
sector. Their positions lie in the south, while the 
autonomous units ore mainly in the north. 
Autonomous units ore composed of guerrillas who 
recently defected from Indonesian armed units, and are 
under the direct command of Fretilin commander, Xonano. 
Regular units ore composed of guerrillas who hove been in 
the resistance for many years, and form the armed wing, 
Fa !inti I. 
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Since the latest Indonesian offensive was launched (see 
page 1 ), concentrating he av ii y on this eastern sector, it 
is more than likely that the guerrilla bases have shifted 
locations. Operating in such a small territory, Fretilin 
has learnt from bitter experience in the late 1970s that 
permanent guerrilla bases are difficult to defend against 
Indonesian attack, so they hove learnt to become highly 
mobile. 
Along the road, units of Falintil, the armed wing of 
Fretilin, launched several attacks on military convoys, 
while the military posts guarding some of the camps were 
attacked. In total, the map reports 15 attacks on camps 
and 7 ambushes on military convoys in this particular 
sector during the 29 months to December 1985. 
Following the numbering in our map, attacks 1, 2 and 3 
occurred in November 1983, February 1984 and July 1984. 
After the third attack, the inhabitants were told to 
abandon the comp md move to oomps 5 and 6. Attack 4 was 
launched in August 1984. After attack 5 in November 1983, 
camp 4 was abC11doned. Attacks 6 and 7 were launched in 
June and August 1984, after which most camp inhabitants 
were moved to camp 2. 
Attack 8 occurred on 8 November, followed by attack 9 
four doys later, launched simultaneously with an ambush 
of a m iii tary convoy. Attacks 10 and 11 occurred on 24 
November 1983 and in August 1984. Attacks 12 and 15 
occurred on 12 and 24 October, while attack 13 was 
launched against the heavily guarded Mehara-Porlamano 
village in August 1984. Attack 14 was in December 1983. 
Indonesia and PNG 
After months of negotiation, Indonesia and Papua New 
Guinea have signed a Treaty of Mutual Respect, Friendship 
and Co-operation. The Treaty pledges non-interference in 
each other's internal affairs. It states that the 
signatories agree "to conduct their respective nations' 
affairs along the mutual border bearing in mind the 
interests of the other" and vow not to cooperate with 
others "in hostile or unlawful acts against each other or 
allow territory to be used for such acts" [The 
Austral ion, 28 October]. 
The Treaty means that PNG formally accepts that it can 
no longer show any concern for human rights violations in 
West Papua, nor question Indonesia's programme of 
swamping the indigenous population by means of massive 
re-settlement of transmigrants from Java and elsewhere in 
the west. 
At the same time, the two countries' Joint Border 
Committee (JBC) hos been meeting to finalise new border 
accords covering the question of 'border-crossers" 
(Indonesia insists that the refugees now in Papua New 
Guinea ore 'border crossers"), joint survey and mapping 
of the border area, ways to improve communications, and 
a memorandum on Search and Rescue (SAR} operations. 
The PNG Foreign Minister hos reportedly proposed that 
SAR teams should be allowed to operate up to within 10 
kilometres of both sides of the border. PNG however 
insists that SAR should not include hot pursuit of armed 
groups fighting against the Indonesian military. The most 
recent J BC meeting in October, held in Bandung, was 
unc:hle to reach og:eement ai the SAR memorandum [Jakarta 
Post, 23 October]. 
Foreign Minister Mochtor mode it clear while in .P?rt 
Moresby that Indonesia is pressing for agreement on J?mt 
military actions with PNG. Asked whether SAR operot~ons 
could be used to disguise search and destroy operations 
against the OPM, he said that if I ndonesio. wonted joint 
military action ''we would be frank about 1t. There may 
come a time when we hove such co-operation" [Sydney 
• 
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An entire village massacred 
The entire population ot the village ot Fo-Mano was 
wiped out by Indonesian troops in a reprisal raid, 
according to a press communique ot the U DT Political 
Commission in Lisbon, issued on 10 September. The 
massacre occurred on 3 August and is believed to hove 
been in reprisal tor a successful Fretilin ambush on 
on Indonesian military convoy a few days earlier near 
the river Be-Bui, when a company of soldiers, 
including the commanding otficer, was k i lied. 
ro-Mono is in the sub-district ot Xano, Uatolari, 
which lies due south of l:foucou, near the south coast. 
According to The Guardian [21 November 1986], the 
, UD I says it has first-hand evidence of the massacre. 
In its communique, the UDT warns that the policy 
being pursued by Indonesia, in refusing to 
acknowledge East Timor's right to selt-determination, 
leaves only two alternatives: a unending war or the 
total liquidation of the East T imorese people. "The 
second alternative does not seem to be far from the 
horizon." 
WEST PAPUA 
sign Friendship Treaty 
Morning Herold, 29 October]. 
PNG lawyer condemns Treaty 
PNG lawyer, Bernard Narokobi, known for his outspoken 
support for West Papuan refugees and condemnation of 
Indonesia's annexation of West Papua, has strongly 
attacked the Treaty, saying it would have the effect of 
silencing the voice of the PNG people, if they choose to 
take the illegal and immoral annexation of West Papua to 
the UN. 
He warned that Indonesia has never agreed to be bound 
by decisions of the International Court of Justice, and 
in the event that Indonesia breached provisions of the 
Treaty, PNG would find it difficult to obtain redress by 
going to the Court [PNG Times, 31 October - 6 November]. 
The Forei~ Minister of PNG, 
Legu Vogi. 
Bernurd Narokobi 
T APOL Bulletin No. 78, December 1986 19 
TRANSMIGRATION 
-~-------- ----- -- - --
News of the transmigration programme 
Public statements by officials responsible for the 
transmigration programme continue to reflect a 
defensiveness against international criticism. Over the 
past few months, officials, ministers and the press have 
continued to proclaim that foreigners are wilfully 
misrepresenting transmigration. Critics are portrayed as 
ignorant or politically motivated, while no-one has 
attempted to answer the criticisms made in a series of 
articles published in the May 1986 issue of The Ecologist 
[Vol. 16, No 2/3, 1986], devoted to transmigration. 
A meeting to discuss the programme that should have 
taken place between representatives of the World Bonk, 
the Indonesian government and Indonesian non-governmental 
organisations {NGOs) was suddenly cancelled ofter Emil 
Salim, Minister for Population and the Environment, 
announced somewhat vaguely that "informal discussions" 
hod taken place instead, and that "since this dialogue 
hos already taken place, the meeting is no longer 
relevant. We hove already given a rational explanation of 
tansmigration" [ Kompos, 1 October 1986]. 
Salim announced that the President had approved the 
creation of a "communications forum on population and 
development to further improve co-ordination of the 
transmigration programme". This is to consist of 
government agencies, members of parliament and 
representatives of NGOs. It appears to be a move to 
institutionalise and thus stifle domestic discussion of 
the programme. 
The Tran5migration Minister has promoted several more 
organised tours of transmigration sites, following the 
large group of western diplomats who were given a guided 
tour in July [see TAPOL Bulleti'l No n, September 1986]. 
Journalists from Papua New Guinea were shown round sites, 
as was a group of fifteen foreign journalists who visited 
Irion Joya. [For a report on their encounter with the 
OPM, see page 11.) 
Press told to cooperate 
Meanwhile, there are blatant efforts to curb press 
interest and critical reporting of the programme. The 
Trnomsigrotion Minister, Martono, used the rather subtle 
Javmese approach of suggesting that the press ls one of 
the sectors involved in making the programme a success. 
It must be part of the "non-governmental implementation 
apparatus" of the programme. The press shout d concentrate 
on disseminating information that is "objective, well-
oimed and useful" to transmigration as a programme that 
promotes the people's welfare. "This doesn't mean I don't 
wont to be criticised. But criticism should be educative 
and informative, and support and develop the programme, 
and not talk a lot of misguided nonsense [nga wur]." 
Significantly, these remarks were addressed to a group 
of journalists from Irion Jayo (West Papua), on a trip to 
see transmigration projects in other parts of the 
country. With reference to Irion Jayo which, as Martono 
recognised, is a focus of world attention, he said that 
journalists should strive for ''balance" and explain the 
psitive aspects of the programrre in Irion Joya" [ Kompos, 
5 August 1986]. 
Meanwhile, the journal of the Irion Jayo Community 
Development Foundation (YPMD-lrian Joya), Kabor dori 
Kampung. has ceased publication, having apparently lost 
its publishing permit. In the post, it has been the only 
publication in Indonesia to produce well-researched 
reports on the damaging effects of transmigration and 
other programmes in the territory. 
Dispossessed peasants warned 
officials by local 
People in Central Java who are holding out for fairer 
compensation for their land and refusing to become 
tronsmigrants, have been threatened with firm action by 
local officials. This follows moves by villagers, who 
have been forced to relinquish their land in favour of a 
hydro-electric plant, to take their complaints to the 
Jogjakarta Legal Aid Institute (LBH). 
The Kedung Ombo dam, part of the project, hos displaced 
3,774 families from three agricultural areas, Grobogan, 
Boyolali and Sragen. The price offered for their land, 
Rp. 633 per square metre, is well below the market price. 
Of the 3,774 families, over 2,000 succumbed to official 
pressure and agreed to transmigrate to Irion Joya, 
Central md South Sumatra. But others are refusing to go. 
The head of the Boyolali office for social and 
political affairs told journalists there is no way the 
compensation offer wil I be increased, claiming that the 
price was agreed after consultation. With intelligence 
officers from the local police and army looking on, he 
alleged that outsiders were manipulating the villagers, 
alleging that their activities hod "criminal tendencies" 
or "smacked of politics". His evidence for these sweeping 
statements rested on the observation that, when 
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questioned about terms used in a letter to petition for 
higher compensation, some villagers were "confused" and 
could not explain what the phrases meant. 
LB H warned to keep out 
So far, he said, the local authorities had confined 
themselves to taking repressive (sic) measures but if the 
situation dragged on, they would adopt firm measures. 
[The borderline between 'repressive' and 'firm' measures 
is not explained.] The authorities would do everything to 
prevent the LBH getting involved, he said. 
Five people from Boyolali representing 775 people in 
three villages have visited the LBH office in Jogjakarta. 
They said they want adequate compensation to buy land 
nearby, stressing that "there is no need to transmigrate 
us". [Suara Merdeka, 4 September and Jakarta Post, 21 
September 1986] 
This case should be viewed in the context of political 
and social circumstances in Central Java. Boyolali is one 
of the most densely populated and impoverished areas of 
Java. Nevertheless, local people are loathe to leave and 
resettle outside Java. The low acceptance rate for 
transmigration in this area has concerned officials for 
some time. Not surprisingly, pre-1965 support for land 
reform was strong and the now-banned communist party 
(PK I) had a huge following in Boyolal i. This was an area 
where the post-October 1965 massacres took a huge toll of 
life. 
The military regime is keen to stamp out any signs of 
community action. This is where several hundred "ex-PK I" 
families displaced by the dam, were told they could not 
transmigrate because of a decree denying "ex-PK I" people 
access to transmigration anywhere in the country. 
Misleading figures 
Officials still persist in claiming that only 2,000 
tansmigrant families have abandoned sites [ Kompas, 14 
October, 1986]. Yet, in the self-same month that this 
claim was repeated, the press reported that 3,301 
transm igrants who were forced to leave their homes in 
Galunggung, district of Tasikmalaya, West Java because of 
a volcanic eruption and thick ash-fall in 1982, have 
returned home. This is particularly striking because 
Galunggung is still covered in ash and is officially 
regarded as being too dangerous to inhabit. 
Officials say that nothing could prevail upon the 
transmigrants to remain where they were. The villagers 
from Galunggung complained that many promises made to 
them had never been kept. The returnees were warned that 
If new disaster befalls them, they will not again be 
allowed to transmigrate. 
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In fact, local officials have taken to warning 
transmigrants, in speeches to departing vii lagers, not to 
return home, even in face of hardship. Thus, the district 
head of T angerang told departing transm igrants: "If any 
amaig you people can't adopt to life on a transmigration 
site, don't come back to Tangerang. I don't need people 
like you here" [Berita Buono, 30 August 1986]. 
No Javanisation 
The charge that transmigration is a vehicle for 
colonisation of the outer islands, East Timor and West 
Papua by the Javanese has stung the administration into 
making cosmetic changes to transmigration policy. People 
are now saying that transmigration should not be spoken 
of in terms of Javanese issues [Sinor Harapan, 22, 26 and 
30 September]. 
Sri Edi Swosono, a lecturer at the University of 
Indonesia, caused a stir when he suggested that charges 
of Javanisation could be avoided if the Javanese stopped 
naming sites, roads and houses with Javanese names and 
became more sensitive to the lifestyles of the indigenous 
people ( KofT1XJSI. 23 September]. This led to allegations of 
Java-phobia. Said one Javanologist, the Javanese were 
making great sacrifices by uprooting themselves, and 
should not be blamed if they want to retain their 
identity by the use of their own names [Sinor Harapal'\ 26 
September]. 
Another development is the emphasis now being given to 
the eastern string of islands, Nusatenggara Timur (NTT) 
and Nusatenggara Barat (NTB) as sources of transmigrants, 
in porticular for resettlement in Irion Jayo. The switch 
came about. with a presidential decree in October, opening 
up NTT and NTB to the outflow of transmigronts. Most of 
these islands, excepting Lombok, have low population 
A typical Javmese transmigrant family. How much better 
off are they than when they were at home in Java? 
densities and are under-developed as compared with Java. 
It is hard to see what purpose these new settlers will 
serve, aport from diverting attention from the issue of 
Javanisatiai. Indeed when NTT governor, retired Major-
General Ben Mboi announced the new decree, he denied 
charges from abroad that transmigration means 
colonisation and Javanisatlon • 
Mboi was also able to amounce, within a month of the 
decree, that no fewer than 50,000 families or about a 
quarter of a mill ion people, have agreed to leave these 
under-populated islands. 
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Lampung now reversing the flow 
of transm igrants 
Lampung, the most important transmigration area in 
Sumatra, has become so over-crowded that provincial 
planners have decided to reverse the region's role, from 
receiving to sending out transmigrants. The turnaround is 
caused primarily by the belated acknowledgement that 
transmigration has caused havoc to the province's forest 
reserves. Things have been exacerbated by serious floods 
that swept parts of South Lampung in November, in which 
around one hundred people lost their lives, with 
thousands more being made homeless. 
The floods are themselves the result of a huge influx 
of people into protected forest lands, who have cut down 
trees indiscriminately for purposes of cultivation 
[Kompas, 5 November 1986]. 
Non-government sponsored transm igrants are entering 
Lampung at a rate of about 1,000 a day, many of them 
settling in protected forest lands or nature reserves. 
According to Minister Martono, the government now faces a 
serious di lemma: the shortage of cash has forced it to 
reduce the number of official transmigratants and rely 
instead on spontaneous transmigrants to help achieve 
targets. But, he complains, the spontaneous transmigrants 
are the ones who settle anywhere they like, and have 
wrought havoc in Lampung's forest-lands [Kompas, 11 
November]. More and more forest lands have become 
critical, and it is estimated that some 400,000 hectares 
of forest land in Lampung are being illegally tilled. 
The decision to start moving out the province's 
'surplus' population followed the discovery that plans to 
shift 42,000 fami I ies now living in protected forest 
lands in South Lampung to North Lampung, had to be 
abandoned because the land intended for them was occupied 
NEW BOOKS 
Suharto on Trial, General H.R. Dharsono's Defence Plea. 
Lembaga Merah Putih, Amsterdam, 1986. 
Price: £3.75 including postage, or £5.25 airmoi I. 
The publication, in English translation, of the defence 
plea of retired Lieutenant-General H.R. Dhorsono, 
delivered in court on 3 January this year, is a useful 
contribution to an understanding of the army's clampdown 
on dissidence since 1984. 
Dharsono was found guilty of subversion and given a 10-
year sentence on 8 January. The sentence was later 
reduced to 7 years on appeal to the High Court. An appeal 
to the Supreme Court upheld the 7-year verdict, after 
which Dharsono announced that he would not ask for 
presidential clemency. 
The book includes several documents on the 1984 Tanjung 
Priok massacre -- the White Book, two testimonies in 
court of victims injured in the shooting, and detailed 
notes about other victims. Dharsono went to cpnsiderable 
lengths to use the court-room to attack General Murdani 's 
official version of what happened in Tanjung Priok by 
examining the provocative events leading to the massacre. 
The retired general, once a staunch supporter of the 
New Order created in 1965 following another massacre, 
when around a million people were slauditered, gradually 
became disillusioned with the course Suharto was taking, 
and turned into one of Suharto's leading critics in the 
1980s. His argument with Suharto is a prime example of 
the controversy that has developed among mi Ii tary 
factions in the past two decades. All are strongly anti-
communist, but offer conflicting ideas of how the 
Indonesian military should run th~ country. 
by settlers from other parts of Indonesia. Now, the 
province's transmigration officials will have to start 
looking elsewhere to re-settle close on half o million 
people. [Kompos, 7 November 1986) 
The crisis currently facing Lompung is a grim foretaste 
of the problems that await other transmigration areas as 
more and more forest-land is cleared to make way for 
settlers from Jovo. 
New scheme of land dispossession 
Meanwhile, the Transmigration Minister hos thought up a 
new scheme to dispossess tribal people in West Papua and 
Kolimanton of their ancestral lands. The scheme is coiled 
''renovating (pe m ugaran) villages". 
The government has been forced to admit that tribal 
people have resisted government plans to incorporate t~em 
into transmigration sites, so plans have now been .devised 
to reconstruct native villages alongside transmigration 
sites located on tribal land. The offer of renovation -
including building roads, schools and the like - will be 
made in exchange for agreement by tribal leaders to allow 
their ancestral lands to be converted into state land. 
Some of the land will then be 'given' to the tribal 
people as plots of private land, and the rest used for 
transm igrants. . . . 
Martono claims he has the agreement of tribal chiefs 
ad local government officers for the scheme [ Kompas, 5 
November 1986]. This disregards the fact that conversion 
of tribal land into private property, even for members of 
the tribe, is in direct conflict with the traditional 
ties between land and tribals who have lived on it for 
generations. It wi II also disrupt people's Ii festy les and 
cause just as much havoc as forcing the people to live on 
transmigration sites. 
By its very nature, this is not a political biography 
of the writer; rather it is his political testament. Bred 
in the same tradition as Suharto, and shoring many 
political ideas, one can question Dharsono's genuine 
commitment to democracy. However, his defence plea must 
certainly rank as one of Indonesia's most important 
political documents of 1986. 
Funu, the U,finished Soga of East Timol', by Jose Romos 
Horta who hos representated Fretil in at the UN since 
1975, gives a compel ling account of the successes and 
frustrations ot working on behalf of East Timor on the 
world stage. We shall publish a review in the next issue, 
with details about the price. 
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MUSLIM TRIALS 
-- - -- -- - . 
'Usroh'prosecutionsspread 
Members of the so-called Usroh network continue to be 
persecuted in towns and villages across Central Java. All 
are charged with subversion and an alleged plot to 
overthrow the Indonesian Republic and replace it with on 
Indonesian Islamic State. Since the first four sentences 
reported in T APOL Bulletin No 77, page 4, many of the 
first group of 16 to be tried have been sentenced. 
The press also reports that in Brebes, East Java, five 
men are being interrogated in connection with Usroh 
teachings, and in Jogjakarta, 2 men have gone on trial 
for alleged Usroh activities. 
The following have been sentenced since our last 
report: 
Sugimon al Yulianto, 29, was sentenced to 10 years in 
Karanganyar. His lawyers condemned the manipulation of 
witnesses, the false construction of evidence and the 
l lusory nature of the Usroh plot [ Kedoulaton Rakyat, 24 
September]. 
In Surakarta, Wiyono al M. Sidik, 31, a goldsmith and 
one of the first to be charged, got 11 years, the longest 
Usroh sentence to date. Wiyono, who broke down when the 
sentence was announced, was alleged to have coordinated 
Usroh throughout Surakarta and its environs [Kedoulotan 
Rakyat, 20 October]. 
In Boyolali, Mualit, 36, a teacher of religion, and his 
brother, Nur Falah, 38, a farmer, were sentenced on the 
some day to 7 years each [Suora Merdeko, 26 October]. 
The largest number of Usroh cases hove been heard in 
K laten, Central Java: 
Slomet Riyodi, 35, and most recently, Porto Sulur, 34, 
both got 8 years. 
Sarjoko, whose trial was hardly reported at all, got 7 
years. 
M. Bakir, 43, a teacher of feligion and alleged 
coordinator of Usroh in K laten, got 9 years. Bakir's 
eagerness to agree with statements by the prosecution and 
judges may have raised suspicions about his role. During 
his trial, however, the prosecutor berated the defendant 
for allegedly communicating with a German member of 
Amnesty Internet ional, that "false, hypocritical and 
inciteful organisation" [ Suaro Merdeka, 17 September]. 
like other Usroh defendants Bakir served a previous term 
for alleged involvement in the socalled 'Warman Terror'. 
Three other defendants have been sentenced: Budi 
Santosa and Rusdi got 8 years, and Marsidi got 5 years. 
fhere is no news about the trials of M. Salim and 'MR'. 
Concocting links with other networks 
A sinister development in the more recent Usroh trials 
is the attempt to links them with other Muslim groupings 
already found guilty of subversion. This became apparent 
in two trials in Jogjakarta where 'MSS', 27, o student at 
Gajah Mada University, and 'MAR' (Mgn bin Syof), 42, a 
tailor, have both been charged with subversion because of 
Usroh connections. 'MSS' is alleged to have conducted 
'training sessions' and criticised the so!e-ideology low, 
while 'MAR' was accused of distributing the banned AI-
Ikhwa) publication. This way, alleged Usroh members are 
beiny linked with seditious activities already proven as 
subversive in other courts. 'MSS' and his friends are 
also said to hove been attempting a revival of the Darul 
Islam and NI I movement. Rejecting these preposterous 
charges, 'MSS' said: 'How con a young man like me, on the 
basis of having listened to a single lecture, be said to 
have decided to found a new state, under whatever name?'' 
He also denied links with anr.thing called Usroh 
[Kedaulaton Rakyat, 21 October. 
The Mus-lim arrests hove spreading further afield to 
Bojonegora, East Java, where three men have been taken in 
for questioning. There is no mention yet of Usroh, but 
their cases are related to Islamic teachings and 
interpretations. 
Another two are being questioned in Surabaya, also East 
Java. These cases appear to relate not to Islamic 
teachings but to Javanese mysticism (kebatinan). Whether 
this indicates a widening of the Usroh net to cover a 
diversity of opinions, or whether new fields are about to 
be ploughed con only be determined by the course of 
events. 
Syarifin Maloko goes on trial 
Syarifin Maloko, one of the Muslim preachers who spoke at 
a rally in Tanjung Priok on 12 September 1984, hours 
before troops shot down demonstrators, has been charged 
in a Jakarta court, following his arrest in West Java, in 
June this year. 
The trial started amid controversy, when the Legal Aid 
Institute (LBH) announced that it could not supply a 
defence team for the trial. Although the refusal was said 
to be because of a lack of lawyers, Buyung Nasution was 
more frank when he explained that there were doubts 
whether the defendant was genuinely fighting for his 
beliefs. "We dont care what the beliefs ore, but we only 
defend genuine people," said Nasution, who coordinates 
defence work for subversive trials. His remarks recall 
strong suspicions, expressed during the Dharsono trial 
when Nasution led the team of defence lawyers, that 
Moloko and another preacher, M. Nasir, ployed a 
provocative role on the night of 12 September. 
After LBH refused to defend Moloko, a team of lawyers 
was supplied by the lawyers' organisation, lkadin. 
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POLITICS 
Election Special II 
~o 
The Presidency 
On 21 October, General Suharto told a Golkor rally that 
he would stand for aiother 5-year term as president. This 
will be his fifth term, outstripping Sukarno who served 
for 20 years. As the sole candidate, Suharto's election 
in 1988, a year after the April 1987 general elections, 
will be a pure formality. 
His acceptance announcement followed months of calls 
from many organisations and oil three political parties, 
queuing up to proclaim their support for yet another term 
for Suharto. All this might be taken as signalling 
overwhelming support for Suharto, but superficial 
observations can be deceptive. As compared with previous 
elections, Suharto's position has recently undergoJ'\e 
quite a battering. Apart from the stories circulating 
about his corruption, more and more people are beginning 
to question his role in the October 1965 events (see item 
on Suharto and the 1965 affair). Moreover, his attempt to 
glorify his role in the 1 Morch 1949 general attack on 
Jogjakarta, which was then under Dutch occupation, is not 
proving very successful. 
It is appasi te to compare for a moment the later years 
of Suharto's presidency with those of his predecessor, 
Sukarno. It was at the height of his popularity in the 
early 1960s that Sukarno was appointed president for life 
and numerous honorific titles were showered on him, 
greatly boosting his ego. But the men responsible for 
this elevation to god-like status, among them some of his 
closest aides, had no intention of strengthening his 
position. On the contrary, although presidential powers 
remained firmly in his hands, the seeds of his own 
downfall were sown by these sycophants, some of whom 
later helped the military to discredit their former boss. 
Suharto too has now attained something approaching god-
like status, but being aware of the mistakes of his 
predecessor, he has avoided life-presidency and shunned 
The three contestants, with Golkor 
in the middle, toke the 'sole-
ideology• road. 
[Sinar Harapan, 16 February 1986] 
titles like 'father of development'. The image he 
projects is humility, a stickler for constitutionality, 
having made sure of the support of all those permitted to 
take part in political processes. 
The succession 
Yet, even so, battles are raging between his closest 
ossociates, and the stakes are high, namely, the 
succession. General Benny Murdani, commander-in-chief of 
the Armed Forces, is openly building his own framework, 
complete with think-tonk, strategic appointments within 
the bureaucracy and a base of his own in the political 
parties. General Sudharmono, State Secretary and chairman 
of Golkar, the other contestant, is doing exactly the 
same, with a greater power base in the bureaucracy though 
virtually nothing among combat troops. 
Moreover, time is running out for Suharto. The stories 
circulating about his ailing health, whether true or not, 
hove made the succession battle more intense, especially 
since Suharto suggested during his acceptance speech that 
he might need to be replaced in mid-term. Perhaps he did 
this deliberately to intensify the rivalry, for the fact 
is that he is becoming more and more lonely at the top. 
There is little left of his 'inner core' group, no-one to 
replace such close associates as General Ali Murtopo and 
General Sudjono Humorchni, both now dead. None of the new 
generation of officers now in top positions of command 
show any signs of 'inner core' eligibility. 
It was Suharto himself who stated publicly that he did 
not want to become president for life. His acceptance 
speech was humble to a fault. But Suharto was clearly 
infuriated by suggestions earlier this year that a 
constitutional 1 imit should be placed on the number of 
term; a president can serve. It was Genera 1 Suhardi man, a 
member of Golkar's contingent in parliament, the very man 
_who master-minded Sukarno's appointment as president for 
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life, who first questioned unlimited presidential terms. 
This indiscretion may have cost Suhordimon his seat in 
Parliament, but re hos rot let the matter rest. In a more 
recent remark, he said that by the end of the next 
presidential term in 1993, a younger generation should 
toke over the leadership, hinting that 1987- 1992 must be 
Suharto's last term. 
So, as the issue of the presidency dies down, the issue 
of vice-presidency is likely to emerge as a focus for 
political manoeuvring. Retired General Amir Machmud, 
chairman of Parliament, recently declaring that there is 
no ban on suggesting candidates for the post [Kompas, 13 
Novemberl a way perhaps of getting the various factions 
to show their cards. Barring major social upheavals, the 
post of vice-president will be the path along which the 
regime's next leader will be chosen. 
Screening the candidates 
Enforced acceptance by all parties of Pancasila as 
their sole-ideology might have been thought enough to 
ensure the regime a thumping majority. Nowadays, which 
ever party 'wins', Parliament will be packed with 
loyalists. However, the regime is leaving nothing to 
chance and will impose tight control over election 
procedures at oil stages. For the purposes of 
supervision, it has created two powerful bodies, a 
screening committee, and a committee to control election 
campaigning. 
General Murdani 
Ever since the first post-1965 general elections in 
1971, the military regime has given itself special powers 
to screen party lists of candidates. This time round, a 
new element has been introduced, the Certificate of 
Personal Cleanliness (SKBD)• [See page 4.j The 
Screening Committee charged with checking election lists 
and ordering the exclusion of candidates deemed 
unsuitable, is a high-power intelligence group, chaired 
by Major-General Hori Sugiman, head of Social and 
Political Affairs at the Interior Ministry. This Central 
Investigation Committee (Panitia Penelitian Pusat), along 
with its regional network of committees, includes the 
state intelligence agencies - Bois and Bakin - the 
security agency, Kopkamtib, the Armed Forces headquarters 
and the Veterans Association. 
Already the press hos reported the elimination of many 
names, and it appears that more Golkar candidates than 
candidates of the other parties hove failed to come up to 
the criteria set by this inquisition. 
POLITICS 
- -
Control I ing the campaign 
State control of the election campaign is in the hands 
of a Panitia Penga was Pelaksanaan Pe mil u P usat (Central 
Committee to Supervise the Conduct of the Election). It 
hos laid down rules which effectively exclude any 
political campaigning by the 'contesting' parties. The 
Attorney-General choirs the Committee, but the key figure 
is the vice-chairman, Major-General Nu~Oho, Armed Forces 
representative on the Committee and prosecutor in charge 
of intelligence affairs at the Attorney-General's Office. 
Nugroho is also a man long associated with General Benny 
Murdani's intelligence network. 
The conditions under which the 1987 campaign w ii 1 be 
conducted are set out in an interview of Nugroho by Tempo 
[4 October 1986), from which we toke the following 
extracts: 
Tempo: Will anyone who breaches the rules lose their 
right to vote? 
Nugroho: That hasn't been regulated. It w ii 1 be discussed 
by the Committee. 
Tempo: Can people be accused of subversion? 
General Sudharmono 
Nugroho: Subversion relates to the material used in the 
campaign. People are prohibited from making attacks. 
Anyone attacking Pancasila or inciting others to hate the 
government will be charged under the Anti-Subversion Low. 
Tempo: What about if people assess government policy? 
Nugroho: That's not allowed either. That could endanger 
national unity. That has to be fenced off (dipagari). Let 
people confine themselves to saying, "If I win, 1 'll 
build you a house". Yes, there are limits. If not, ethnic 
or religious matters could emerge ... 
Tempo: The elections will choose Parliament and hence 
also the MPR (People's Assembly~ It's the MPR that will 
choose the next government and it is legally entitled to 
assess the present government's performance. 
Nugroho: Oh yes, that's legal . But as for the elections, 
this is a matter of the nation's interests. So, there are 
general laws, and there ore also limits required by the 
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situation and cooditions. People con soy things like that 
in America because when people say things there, it 
doesn't matter. But here, religious and ethnic questions 
are sensitive. 
Tempo: But the security situation is stable, isn't it? 
Nugroho: Yes, but we don't want there to be victims. 
That's to do with the conditions. Each country has its 
own rules according to the conditions. So we need to 
fence things off •.•• 
Tempo: What about preaching in the mosques? 
Nugroho: If sermons smack of campaigning and they are 
delivered during the campaign, that•s forbidden. If it's 
not during the campaign, then it's a matter for the 
security forces. 
Tempo: How far will the counting of votes be reliable? 
Nugroho: Well, there's our Committee and there ore 
witnesses. And also, we have a free press in Indonesia, 
don't we? 
* * * * * 
It has also been announced that all campaign speeches 
will be vetted by a special comm it tee under the Ministry 
of the Interior with representatives of the police and 
other security agencies LJakarta Post, 21 August 1986]. 
The announcement suggests that all speeches will have to 
be handed in, in advance, for vetting. 
In his TelTlX> interview, Nugroho also said that, to make 
sure campaign speeches oome within the rules, "there will 
be people listening to speeches, so as to report 
(breaches)". As our readers will know, much of the 
evidence used in the current Muslim trials was based on 
the reports of army spies monitoring public speeches. 
Armed Forces loosens 
ties with Golkar 
Lieutenant-General Bambang Triantoro, assistant for 
social and political affairs at the Armed Forces HQ, has 
announced that the Armed Forces will loosen its ties with 
Golkar [ Tempq. .20 September 1986]. This is a departure 
from earlier elections when the Armed Forces gave massive 
support to Golkar. Now that all parties have complied 
with the sole-ideology law, making Pancosila their only 
Lieutenant-General Bambang Triantoro 
principle, Triantoro sees no reason why .retire.d milit~ry 
officers, for example, should not throw an thfe1r lot ';'1th 
the PDI or the PPP, something unheard-a in previous 
elections. In fact, he said the Armed Forces should help 
the two smaller parties perform well at the elections. 
Triantoro's statement is in line with General Benny 
Murdani 's recent pronouncements, pleading for the non-
Golkar 'contestants' to be helped along in their 
campaigns. As explained in our earlier Election Special, 
Murdoni ployed quite a role in rescuing the PD I from 
collapse. 
The PD I, once the rump party composed of the old 
nationalist party, PNI, and the two Christian parties, 
Parkindo and Partai Katolik, has now been re-born, 
becoming more like a business enterprise than a political 
party. Indeed, Hardjantho, o PDI veteran and still PDI 
vice-chairman of Parliament, is so disgusted with the 
new-style PD 1 which he compared to a "veem" (a harbour 
company) that he has announced he will not accept 
nomination for it in the coming elections. 
There are shifting patterns of loyalty towards the non-
Golkar parties. Whereas Christians previously tended to 
see Golkar as the safe party to support, rather than the 
old-style PDl which was supposed to have been 'their 
party', they now appear to be turning back to the PDI 
which, under new management, can be regarded as a safe 
haven and well-regarded in army circles. Muslims on the 
other hand have lost any sense of identity with the PPP 
and are enlisting with Golkar, especially in Central and 
East Java. 
The Armed Forces Fraction 
The Armed Forces fraction has also undergone change. 
This is the parliamentary group consisting of military 
appointees. In the new, enlarged parliament of 500 seats, 
they w ii 1 get 100 seats, 25 more than at present. Up to 
now, Armed Forces MPs have mostly come from the ranks of 
retired colonels or generals. Now, the Armed Forces w ii 1 
choose their MPs from officers still on active service, 
causing a major overhaul in the composition of their 
fraction. The majority of their present MPs will be 
retired from parliament, with 23 being shifted over to 
Golkar. They will expect to be high enough up on Golkar 
lists to be sure of retaining a seat in 1987. 
The Armed Forces leadership now regard a stint in 
parliament as an essential element in the career of 
higher-ranking officers. In August this year, many 
carefully selected officers attended a special course on 
'how to be a parliamentarian". Most were Heutenant-
colonels, colonels and brigadier-generals with a 
spattering of majors. They were drilled not only for 
parliament but also for the provincial and district 
assemblies. 
An example of this new-style integration between 
military and political duties is Major-General Saiful 
Sulun, now commander of the prestigious East Java 
Division who has already served a term in parliament. 
The army sees this integration as one way to safeguard 
its constant meddling in social and political affairs, 
the non-military side of the dual-function. The key 
message conveyed to the men at the recent seminar was 
that a seat in parliament is a good place "to mingle with 
society". 
The Armed Forces fraction acts as the watchdog of 
government policies in parliament. As parliamentarians, 
they do not lose their military zeal. Should any wayward 
MP dare to express a dissenting voice, the military MPs 
will be there to bark them down. A 11 the talk about 
'mingling with society' does not detract from the deep-
rooted military contempt for civilian politicians. There 
is no sign that this tradition will change among the new 
crop of officers who will be putting away their uniforms 
for a while, to play o role in Indonesia's 'People's 
Representative Council'. 
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Sinar Harapan closed for good 
Sinor Harapan, one of Indonesia's two independent 
newspapers, hos been closed down for good. The paper's 
publishing permit was annulled on 9 October, and on 30 
October, Minister of Information Harmoko announced, 
following a meeting with President Suharto, that the 
paper would never be allowed to appear again [Kompas, 30 
October]. 
SH had the second largest circulation in the country, 
around 350,000 copies, second only to the Catholic 
paper, Kompas. It was an evening paper, competing 
successfully with the only other evening paper in the 
capital, Terbit, a sensational paper owned by the Pos 
K ota group of which Information Minister Harmoko was 
formerly managing-director. 
The edict banning the paper accused it of publishing 
"speculative" reports which "might fuel unrest among the 
people ••• no matter whether there is any truth in the 
reports". The paper was therefore accused of posing a 
"threat to national stability". 
Sina.r H.v:apan, 11 February 1984. 
Meanwhile, a Semarang, Central Java doily, Suara 
Merdekq and three North Sumatra doilies, Analisa, Sinor 
Indonesia nnd Waspada, were given "stern warnings" for 
publishing the report on import regulations that led to 
SH's closure. 
Suharto business interests involved 
The item which led toSinar's demise was a report that 
the Trade Ministry was planning to revoke forty-four 
regulations which confer monopolies on a number of 
companies for the import of industrial materials. 
Following the 12 September devaluation of the rupiah, 
many commentators had stressed the need to remove these 
monopolies which are a primary factor in keeping domestic 
production costs high. [See T APOL Bulletin, No 77, 
September 1986.] 
The controversy directly affects Suharto's closest 
business associates. Some monopolies are held by Liem 
Sioe Uong companies while others are held by his sons, 
Sigit, Bombang and Tommy. According to the For Eastern 
Economic Review [30 Octoberl these three are now known 
in Jakarta business circles as the 'Tosibo Group', apeing 
the name of the huge Japanese electronics monopoly. 
(Needless to say, the FEE R article was expunged from the 
journal. The page was torn out of all copies before the 
issue was distributed in Indonesia.) 
In early October, pressure for these regulations to be 
lifted was intensifying and it appears that top-level 
circles pushing for this used the paper to reinforce 
their campaign. 
However, the paper and its publishing house has been 
annoying the regime for some time. In recent months, it 
published comments suggesting that in future, Indonesian 
presidents should not be allowed to serve for more than 
two five-year terms. (Suharto has recently announced his 
intent ion to stand for a fifth term.) It was al so the 
Sinor publishing group that published the Indonesian 
translation of Harold Crouch's The Army and Politics in 
Indonesia, which was recently banned [see T APOL Bulletin, 
No 76, July 1986]. 
A take-over battle? 
Sirltu's closure could open the way for a battle to take 
over this major publishing house and all its extensive 
printing foci lities. Already as long ago as February this 
year, General Murdani was hinting, soon after Golkar had 
toke control of another Jakarta daily, Pelito, formerly a 
paper representing the views of the then Muslim party, 
PPP, that it might beSinar's turn next [ FEE~ 6 March 
1986. See also TAPOL Bulletin, No 74, March 1986.] 
It would not be in Murdani's interest to promote a 
Golkar takeover of the paper, however. His interests lie 
these days in promoting the re-vamped PDI which he is 
trying to use to clip the wings of his arch-rival, 
General Sudharmono, Golkar chairman. Sinor Harapan, as a 
matter of fact, was the publication of the protestant 
churches whose party formerly merged into PDI. The paper 
has long ceased to be regarded as the mouthpiece of any 
party. Murdoni may now wish to provide his favourite 
party with a media vehicle to bolster its image in the 
run-up to the April 1987 general elections. 
When announcing that Sinor Harqxn had been closed down 
for good, Hormoko said that another paper could of course 
appear in its stead, provided "its ideological, 
juridical, strategic and social basis" was acceptable. 
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Habibie seeks new 
Indonesia's decision to purchase 12 F -16 fighter planes 
from the US has opened up new opportunities for B.J. 
Habibie, head of Indonesia's military-industrial complex. 
His earlier image as a European ally has been modified 
overnight, and the doors of US arms manufacturers have 
been opened wide. 
He was clearly delighted with the red-carpet welcome 
accorded to him when he visited Washington in October. 
His main purpose was to seek openings for the transfer of 
technology now made possible by the 35 per cent 'offset' 
written in to the F-16 deal, obliging the manufacturers, 
General Dynamics, to purchase components from Habibie's 
company, IPTN. 
It is common knowledge that America's exports of hi-
tech equipment and know-how i's controlled by the 
Departments of Defence and Trade. Such tranfers are 
normally allowed only to America's closest allies, 
primarily the NATO countries. But Defence Secretary of 
State, Caspar Weinberger expressed support, during 
Hobibie's visit, for the promotion of Indonesia's arms 
industry. 
US Air Force chief-of-staff, General Lawrence D. Welch 
told Habibie the US does not rule on the possible use of 
IPTN-made aircraft by the US Air Force, while Assistant 
Secretory of Defence, Everett Pyatt expressed great 
interest in the 30-yeor pion of Indonesia's shipbuilding 
company, PT PAL, to build 23 frigates. 
But Hobibie's biggest prize of the trip, however, was 
on agreement in principle to buy a 'super-computer' worth 
$4 million, designed especially for defence and security 
purposes and for the aerospace industry. 
In between his heavy schedule, Hobibie was awarded a 
special honour by the US Notional Academy of Engineering. 
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• openings • 1n the us 
Con Indonesia affo£d it? 
While Hobibie's image got yet another boost from his 
Washington trip, questions have arisen as to whether 
these ambitious plans con be implemented. Indonesia's 
Defence Minister, General Ponimon, hos recently stressed 
the need for strict austerity in his Department. The fall 
in oil prices and the 12 September devaluation of 45 per 
cent hove made it difficult for Indonesia to keep up with 
many defence contracts under negotiation. 
According to Poniman, several deals now pending will 
have to be reviewed. This could include a $60 million 
deal with the Netherlands for 4 Von Spejk frigates. But 
Poniman stressed that deals already signed, such as the 
purchase of Rapier missiles from the UK, will not be 
affected. 
Poniman was careful to stress that austerity measures 
would not affect the operational activities of the Armed 
Forces. [Kompas, 19 September 1986) In other words, the 
Indonesian military can be sure of getting all the cash 
it needs to pursue the offensive in East T imor and the 
heightened level of military operations in West Papua. 
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